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 Abstract 
This thesis examines the internationalist message in news coverage and editorial 
commentary of a select group of American newspapers in the last throes and years immediately 
after World War I.  Some historians have misinterpreted this period as a “return” to isolationist 
sentiments throughout America.  However, the articles and editorials in these papers presented a 
message that America was still concerned with the happenings of the world and willing to 
participate in ascertaining solutions to the problems confronting Europeans as well as other 
peoples around the globe.  The first chapter looks at the late stages of the war through the 
Senate‟s rejection of the Versailles Treaty.  These papers initially presented a message of hope 
that the war could become the last war in history, spearheaded by President Wilson‟s Fourteen 
Point program.  However, these hopes were dashed when the Fourteen Points were largely 
overlooked in the treaty.  In the ensuing fight between the administration and the treaty‟s 
dissenters there were no threats of isolating the country from world affairs.  According to these 
sources, those proposing reservations to the treaty were unwilling to commit the country to the 
League of Nations because they believed the League to be a permanent military alliance that 
violated the Constitution.  The second chapter examines how the debate over the treaty and 
League membership became significant issues throughout 1920, reaching a climax with the 
presidential election in November.  This section focuses on the coverage of Senator Harding‟s 
message of continued U.S. international participation throughout the campaign.  The coverage 
from these papers regarding the international affairs of and events during the Harding 
administration is investigated in the final chapter.  This chapter focuses heavily on the reactions 
to the Washington Conference of 1921-1922 which established international naval arms 
limitations.  Harding and his policies enjoyed significant popular support from many of these 
 papers because they believed he established a lasting peace.  Throughout this period, the 
editorials and news coverage in these papers presented U.S. leaders as actively participating in 
global affairs rather than proposing the country step back from a leadership position in the world. 
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 1 
INTRODUCTION 
It is common that in some history textbooks that United States foreign policy after the 
First World War to be characterized as isolationist.  Dennis Sherman and Joyce Salisbury, in 
their authoritative Western Civilization textbook The West in the World (2001), contend that 
after the Treaty of Versailles had been presented to Congress President Wilson “failed to 
persuade the isolationist American Senate to ratify the peace accords and join the League [of 
Nations].  What little faith Great Britain and France had in Wilson‟s ideas quickly disappeared.”1  
John McKay, Bennett Hill, and John Buckler assert in their survey A History of Western Society 
(1995) that in the aftermath of the Senate‟s rejection of the Versailles Treaty “America turned its 
back on Europe.”2  Some scholars, especially from but not limited to the post-World War Two 
era, have created what historian Alan Brinkley has termed the “myth of isolationism” to 
characterize the sentiments of United States policy makers as well as the public at large after the 
First World War.
3
  This study, based on a survey of several different American newspapers, 
agrees with Brinkley‟s characterization and argues that many in the press presented no 
overwhelming sense of isolationism in the nation.  In fact significant exemplars in the American 
press, in the last throes of the war and soon afterward, exhibited a significant interest in political, 
military, and social events abroad.  Newspapers from different regions of the country and 
                                                 
1
 Dennis Sherman and Joyce Salisbury, The West in the World, Updated Second Edition (Boston: McGraw-Hill 
Companies, 2001, 2004, 2006), 756.  Other textbooks have this same general presentation; see also Marvin Perry et 
al, Western Civilization: Ideas, Politics & Society, Fourth Edition (Boston and Toronto: Houghton Mifflin 
Company, 1992), 797. 
2
 John P. McKay, Bennett D. Hill and John Buckler, A History of Western Society, Fifth Edition (Boston and 
Toronto: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1995), 929.  The entire piece on the development on American isolationism 
can be found on pages 927-930. 
3
 Alan Brinkley, American History: A Survey, Vol. II: Since 1865, Eleventh Edition (Boston: McGraw Hill Co., 
2003), 730. 
 2 
reflecting varying partisan biases present a nation deeply intrigued with, concerned about, and 
supportive of United States participation in international affairs.  
When did this myth of isolationism become such a mainstay of American history?  The 
theme of American isolationist has appeared regularly in American diplomatic, social, and 
political historiography since the 1920s.   However, the myth of isolationism took on new 
significance in both academia and popular memory in the post-World War Two era.  During this 
period historians, reflecting the times in which they were writing, began to see the United States‟ 
refusal to sign the Treaty of Versailles and join the League of Nations as the beginning of the 
destabilization of international politics that led to World War Two.  For example, historian Selig 
Adler claimed in 1957 that “the isolationists have been willing to gamble on the destruction of 
friendly countries, preferring to fight only when confronted with immediate danger” while 
believing that the U.S. “can best serve the world by going-it-alone.”4  Adler time and again 
returned to the idea that if the United States did not participate in world affairs in an assertive 
and preemptive manner then it would be impossible to stabilize the world political system.  The 
collective security that Adler desired was not achieved after the First World War supposedly 
because isolationists in the U.S. Senate refused to ratify the Treaty of Versailles or authorize 
joining the League of Nations, thus leading to another world war. 
Historians during this period were not just concerned with military affairs; some scholars 
revisited economic affairs from the post-World War One era.  In his book The Revolution in 
World Trade and American Economic Policy (1957), Samuel Lubell asserted that a return to 
“isolationist” ways of conducting economic relations through the gold standard, tariffs, and other 
policies precipitated the economic failure of the late 1920s and 1930s.  He held that international 
                                                 
4
 Selig Adler, The Isolationist Impulse: Its Twentieth-Century Reaction (New York: Abeland-Schuman Limited, 
1957), 29. 
 3 
economic cooperation ought to be the “paramount concern of all Americans” because it was 
crucial to “strategic survival.”5  According to Lubell, without economic leadership, technological 
innovation, and military commitment, the United States would surely repeat the errors which led 
to World War Two.   
This perception has not been unique to the work of American scholars.   European 
historians also adopted the idea that isolation overtook America after the First World War and 
led to the outbreak of World War Two.  In Great Britain and the United States: A History of 
Anglo-American Relations, 1783-1952 (1955), British historian H.C. Allen opened a chapter 
titled “Isolationism (1921-1939)” by stating: 
The policy of the United States between 1921 and 1937 may be described as 
one of deliberate withdrawal from the affairs of the world.  If President Wilson had 
succeeded in one thing, it was convincing the American people that they had entered 
the war for moral reasons, so that when they repudiated him and all his works they 
naturally reverted with great fervour to their traditional belief that Europe, and 
European politics in particular, constituted a hopeless sink of antiquity which 
American were very fortunate to be clear of.  They shook its dust off their feet with 
gladness and vowed never to become embroiled in its affairs again.
6
 
 
The author went on to downplay or ignore the Harding administration‟s involvement in 
European economic and military affairs.  Allen claimed that the only way to avert international 
political instability was to promote strong Anglo-American cooperation, unlike what happened in 
the wake of the First World War.  This failure, in Allen‟s view, caused the instability that led to 
the rise of totalitarian leaders who threatened global security.
7
 
However, not all historians have followed the track set out by these post-World War Two 
scholars.  William Appleman Williams criticized the myth of American isolationism in his study 
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 Samuel Lubell, The Revolution in World Trade and American Economic Policy (New York: Harper and Brothers, 
Publishers, 1955), 10 & 27. 
6
 H.C. Allen, Great Britain and the United States: A History of Anglo-American Relations, 1783-1952 (New York: 
St. Martin‟s Press Inc., 1955), 724. 
7
 Ibid., 788-794. 
 4 
The Tragedy of American Foreign Policy (1955).  Williams asserted that the myth, or “legend” 
as he termed it, of isolationism “not only deforms the history of the decade from 1919 to 1930, 
but it also twists the story of American entry into World War II and warps the record of the cold 
war.”8  Keenly, Williams also recognized that there were far more complex reasons for rejecting 
the Treaty of Versailles and League of Nations than simple isolationism.  He contended that it 
was various groups disagreeing over, among other things, the military commitment attached to 
the League of Nations in Article X that led to the rejection of the Versailles Treaty.  This study 
was in opposition to previous accounts, which alleged that it was a single isolationist group of 
considerable size that was in absolute opposition to internationalism.
9
 
Williams‟s argument has remained relevant into the twenty-first century, partly because 
other historians continued to perpetuate the isolationist myth.  The Pursuit of Isolationism in the 
United States Senate from Versailles to Pearl Harbor (1982) by Thomas N. Guinsburg was one 
such study.  Guinsburg altered the argument for isolationism by claiming that the isolationists 
were a minority in the U.S. Senate but that they used a: 
…series of campaigns that exploited all available opportunities.  They provided the 
persuasive rhetoric, articulated the ideological bases of support, and capitalized on 
regional, ethnic, and partisan resentments to garner vital support from colleagues 
lacking deep isolationist convictions.
10
 
  
The main problem with this argument is that it places all the rationale for major political 
decisions in a very small group within the U.S. Senate (13 Senators at best).  Also, Guinsburg 
claims that isolationism prevailed throughout the entire thirteen-year period between Woodrow 
Wilson‟s and Franklin Roosevelt‟s terms as President.  This argument is misleading in light of 
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 William Appleman Williams, The Tragedy of American Diplomacy (New York: Dell Publishing Co., Inc., 1959, 
1962 & 1972), 110. 
9
 Ibid., 111-118. 
10
 Thomas N. Guinsburg, The Pursuit of Isolationism in the United States Senate from Versailles to Pearl Harbor 
(New York: Garland Publishing Inc., 1982), 18. 
 5 
the Washington Naval Conference that established armament limitation agreements between 
Great Britain, Japan and the United States, as well as regulations for maintenance of open trade 
for all nations with China.  It was also during these years that the Republican administrations 
reached out to the nations of Europe with economic aid strategies in the Dawes and Young Plans, 
which sought to alleviate the problems surrounding reparation payments from the former Central 
Powers to France, Great Britain, and the other Allied powers.  Each of these negotiations brought 
the leaders of Europe and the U.S. together to negotiate very important international issues.  
Guinsburg, finally, covers and blurs the differences between two very distinct and dissimilar eras 
in American history, the post-World War I boom and the era of the Great Depression and the 
New Deal. 
The myth of isolationism (or at least of the power of the few isolationists within the 
Senate) persisted.  In Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy (1987), Michael Hunt, for example, 
argued that President Wilson faced opposition to the Treaty of Versailles and League of Nations 
on multiple fronts.  Yet Hunt gave a large amount of credit to the very small group of 
isolationists or “irreconcilables” in Congress.  Hunt failed to give due attention to the Republican 
leaders in the Senate, such as Henry Cabot Lodge, Elihu Root, and Philander Knox, who led the 
opposition to the treaty because they disagreed with the method of employing American power 
overseas, not because they wanted to keep the U.S. isolated from the world.  The isolationists, 
both Republican and Democratic were in such a minority that they played a relatively 
insignificant role in the actual rejection of the Treaty of Versailles.  Hunt also alleged that the 
nation rejected both Wilson and internationalism with Warren Harding‟s landslide election as 
 6 
president in 1920.
11
  The 1920 election is often misinterpreted by historians because of the 
lopsided victory for the Republicans (61 percent of the popular vote went to Harding) and the 
rejection of the Treaty of Versailles, but Harding‟s campaign had an internationalist message, 
too.  Once elected, Harding and a number of his cabinet members worked tirelessly and publicly 
for increased U.S. participation overseas, particularly in Europe and East Asia. 
Ronald Powaski‟s Toward an Entangling Alliance: American Isolationism, 
Internationalism, and Europe, 1901-1950 (1991) extended the myth into the post-Cold War era.  
Powaski claimed that Wilson‟s inability to command the political situation in the United States 
“made possible the return to American isolationism after the war.”12  In the second chapter, titled 
“Republican Isolationism, 1921-1933,” Powaski asserted that the Harding administration 
intended to participate in international affairs more actively than it actually did.  He held that the 
Harding administration failed to engage the world more fully because they feared that Congress 
would attack them vigorously and perhaps cause serious problems for their domestic agenda.  
Powaski alleged that the Washington Conference did little for European security and was a half-
hearted measure to exercise American power in foreign relations.
13
  However, the duration or 
ultimate effectiveness of such agreements should not serve as measure of American sentiments 
during this period.  In fact, as we will see, the Washington Naval Conference received a good 
deal of press coverage and was widely viewed as a positive international engagement on the part 
of the Harding administration.  Powaski disregarded the importance of the conference as a means 
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 Michael H. Hunt, Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy (New Haven, Connecticut and London: Yale University 
Press, 1987), 135-138.  Hunt also failed to consider that Cox was a very weak compromise candidate because the 
other Democratic candidates had knocked each other out of the race. 
12
 Ronald E. Powaski, Toward and Entangling Alliance: American Isolationism, Internationalism, and Europe, 
1901-1950 (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1991), 25. 
13
 Ibid., 36-37. 
 7 
of setting international limits on costly armaments.  In this interpretation there is also the risk of 
equating an effort to diminish war with isolationism, which would be an unfortunate mistake. 
More recent studies of the war, Woodrow Wilson, the Treaty of Versailles, the League of 
Nations, and their legacies have returned to William Appleman Williams‟s interpretation of post-
World War One isolationism as a myth.  Thomas Fleming‟s Illusion of Victory (2003) and 
Thomas Knock‟s To End All Wars: Woodrow Wilson and the Quest for a New World Order 
(1992) are studies that more accurately depict the complex arguments of Republicans who stood 
against the Treaty of Versailles and League of Nations.  In these works, the authors identify the 
various disagreements that Republican Senators Henry Cabot Lodge, Hiram Johnson, William 
Borah, and others had concerning encroachments on American sovereignty, particularly 
Congressional powers to declare war.  Fleming and Knock present the United States as both 
accepting of its new role as a leader in world affairs and unwilling to sacrifice national interests 
to secure the economic and military security of European nations.
14
  These studies are a far cry 
from arguing that the United States embraced isolationism in the wake of the First World War. 
This study builds on the work of historians, like Fleming and Knock, who take issue with 
the isolationist myth.  As mentioned above, this project examines news coverage of U.S. 
international policy in the late war and post-war periods.  The primary sources used for this study 
include the New York Times, New York Herald, New York World, Kansas City Star, San 
Francisco Examiner and Los Angeles Times.  These newspapers represent not just a sampling 
from different regions but also competing political, market, and, in some instances, personal 
rivalries.  These cases suggest that both intra-region and inter-regional news coverage applauded 
internationalism. 
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 Thomas Fleming, The Illusion of Victory: America in World War I (New York: Basic Books, 2003), 449-470 and 
Thomas J. Knock, To End All Wars: Woodrow Wilson and the Quest for a New World Order (Princeton, New 
Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1992), 232-240. 
 8 
New York City was the main American distribution point for European news at this time.  
The telegraph cables that conveyed the news from mainland Europe to the United States went 
through London to New York.  Access to the lines permitted the papers in New York to cover 
European news first.  It was also common for smaller papers around the country to republish 
stories from the New York papers or the Associated Press in order to provide their readers with 
international news.
15
  Within this larger market with various newspapers, there were significant 
differences in partisan biases and competition between the New York Times, New York Herald 
and New York World, with each publishing its own perspective on the events of the day. 
Historians Thomas Fleming and David Halberstam consider The New York Times one of 
the least biased news sources in the city at the time, but its editorial commentary was favorable 
to the Democrats, particularly with respect to Wilson‟s international policies.16  The New York 
World was regarded as a staunch voice for the Wilson administration.  According to Fleming, the 
principal rival of the Times was the New York Herald, which during this period merged with or 
bought outright the Sun, New York Tribune and other papers, thus increasing its circulation.  The 
Herald was a Republican paper, but largely put partisan issues aside once the U.S. entered the 
Great War.  However, it resumed its pro-Republican stance as disagreements arose over the 
Treaty of Versailles and U.S. membership in the League of Nations.
17
 
The Kansas City Star – and its morning edition, the Kansas City Times – provides a point 
of view from the Midwest.  The Star was recognized as a leading regional paper with a large 
                                                 
15
 Si Sheppard, The Partisan Press: A History of Media Bias in the United States (Jefferson, North Carolina: 
McFarland and Company, Inc., 2008), 196-201 & 216-221. 
16
 Fleming, The Illusion of Victory, 181 and David Halberstam, The Powers That Be (Urbana: University of Illinois 
Press, 2000), 210-214.  Under the direction of Adolph Ochs, the Times became one of the most reputable papers 
nationwide and made significant strides in instituting objectivity standards in news reporting. 
17
 Fleming, The Illusion of Victory, 179 and Halberstam, The Powers That Be, 213-214.  Halberstam claims that in 
the post-World War I era that the Times and Herald (later in the 1920s, the Herald-Tribune) widened their positions 
as most dominant news sources in New York. 
 9 
circulation during this period.
18
  It had to balance regional political allegiances between 
Democrats, Republicans, and Populists, making its bias much less narrow than those of other 
papers.  However, it is fair to suggest that the Star leaned toward the Republican Party at this 
time.  The Star had consistently published editorials and commentary from President Theodore 
Roosevelt throughout the war and even ran material from him found after he died in 1919.
19
  The 
Star‟s bias is perhaps best described during this period as progressive Republican. 
In comparison to the east coast papers in this study, western newspapers were equally 
biased in their news coverage.  Two important California papers demonstrated starkly opposed 
allegiances and interests.  The San Francisco Examiner was the first paper owned by William 
Randolph Hearst and remained the west coast headquarters for his newspaper empire during the 
1910s and 1920s.
20
  Hearst was an adamant Democrat and his papers supported President Wilson 
vigorously throughout his time in office up until the post-war period in which the Treaty of 
Versailles and the League of Nations became volatile issues across the country.  Hearst, while 
still supporting the Democratic Party, sided with those opposing permanent European alliances, 
which they viewed as unnecessary entanglements with European powers.  The Examiner became 
the opposition press to Wilsonian Democrats.  The paper regularly featured editorials from 
Republicans well-known in California and national politics, to gather support against agreeing to 
the Treaty of Versailles and membership in the League of Nations. 
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 The Kansas City Star, under the ownership of the Nelson family during this period, published the Kansas City 
Times as well as two editions of the Star Mondays through Saturdays, with two weekly editions for Kansas and 
Missouri customers on Wednesdays and a single edition on Sundays during this period.  For clarity, when I cite 
articles from the Times in this paper I will refer to them in the text as from the Kansas City Star even though the 
citation will identify the Times as the source. 
19
 Fleming, Illusion of Victory, 329. 
20
 To call Hearst an isolationist, as many historians have, would have to discount his role in the Spanish American 
War with the Yellow Press and many other claims he made in his lifetime about U.S. involvement in foreign 
countries, particularly Latin American nations.  Also, the Examiner regularly ran editorial commentary from Hearst 
which espoused his opposition to the Treaty of Versailles and League of Nations but did not supporting isolationism. 
 10 
The Los Angeles Times provides a counterbalance to the Examiner in this study.  At the 
beginning of the war in 1914 the paper was published by Harrison Gray Otis.  Otis was a living 
legend because of his participation in the Republican convention that had nominated Abraham 
Lincoln for president in 1860, his service in the Civil War, and his volunteer service in the 
Philippine-American War of 1899-1902.  After the war he was referred to affectionately as 
“General Otis.”  Before his death in July 1917, Otis passed formal control of the paper to his son-
in-law, Harry Chandler.  According to historian Dennis McDougal, under Chandler the Times 
was the unfettered cheerleader of the “Republican Oligarchy” in Los Angeles and the party 
throughout the nation.  Chandler made enemies with William Randolph Hearst and any other 
political force seeking to take power away from the Republican Party in California.  At the 
beginning of the war in 1914 both Otis and Chandler were supporters of U.S. intervention into 
Europe affairs before the country entered the war, even crossing party lines to support President 
Wilson in reaching out to the Central Powers for lasting peace.  After the war, however, partisan 
hostility resumed between Chandler and his in-state publishing and political rivals.
21
  The Times 
launched an assault on Hearst accusing him of being a German operative during the war.  
Though nothing came of these claims, the event shows the hostility between the two papers.   
These newspapers suggest that isolationism did not permeate American society between 
1918 and 1923.  This study focuses on them in three sections, each of which deals with a specific 
issue as America made its transition into its new role as a world power in international affairs.  
The first main chapter examines the initial release of President Woodrow Wilson‟s Fourteen 
Points, which highlighted his formula for lasting world peace in January 1919 and how the press 
came to expect the Fourteen Points to be an outcome of the war.  When the Fourteen Points 
                                                 
21
 Dennis McDougal, Privileged Son: Otis Chandler and the Rise and Fall of the L.A. Times Dynasty (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: Perseus Publishing, 2001), 84-87. 
 11 
“program” was mostly overlooked as Wilson and other Allied leaders largely made the terms of 
the Treaty of Versailles a conquerors‟ settlement, the press became less enthusiastic about the 
outcome of the war.  This section also examines how overwhelming media optimism about the 
future of world peace with Wilson at the helm gradually faded upon learning of the terms of the 
Treaty of Versailles.  However, these diminished hopes in parts of the press did not immediately 
turn into general rejection of the treaty or membership in the League of Nations.  The chapter 
concludes with the Treaty of Versailles‟s fate in the U.S. Senate.  The newspapers examined in 
this study suggest that the Senate ultimately rejected the treaty not because of isolationist 
sentiments but because “reservationist” Senators, led by Republican Senator Lodge, had a 
different notion of the president‟s ability to commit military support for international conflicts 
without the approval of Congress.  The conflict between the reservationist Republicans, whose 
willingness to accept the treaty might have been resurgent had Wilson accepted revisions to it, 
and the administration were also exacerbated by the stubbornness of President Wilson. 
The second chapter opens with the ratification of the Treaty by the European powers and 
subsequent efforts to resurrect the peace plan in the Senate in early 1920.  It then examines the 
1920 presidential race between Democratic candidate James Cox and Republican nominee 
Warren Harding.  The Treaty of Versailles, its ratification, and membership in the League of 
Nations became pivotal issues in the election, which was an overwhelming electoral success for 
the Republican Party across the country.  Historical accounts frequently describe the 1920 
election as a victory of isolationism over Wilsonian internationalism, but this was not the case.  
As the election reached its climax, the newspapers used in this study published stories and 
editorials presenting the differing internationalist messages of the two candidates.  When 
Americans went to the polls in November, they were not choosing between internationalism and 
 12 
isolationism, but between two distinct visions of where and how the United States would 
participate in the post-war world. 
The third section examines the Harding administration‟s international negotiations that 
received significant media interest.  This section pays particular attention to the Washington 
Conference that took place between November 1921 and February 1922.  The Washington 
Conference, guided by Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes, confirms that the Harding 
administration was not isolationist in its approach to foreign relations.
22
  At the conference the 
United States took the reins of international discussions on an unprecedented scale by gathering 
world powers in hopes of reaching a general agreement on naval arms limitations.  Many in the 
press viewed the call for arms reductions and limitations as the most effective way to limit the 
possibility of future wars and to reduce their scope if they did break out.  The vast majority of the 
coverage of the Washington Conference by these papers reveals clear support for an 
administration that appeared to be untroubled about taking the lead in negotiations with many 
other nations in hopes of deterring another war.  This section concludes with the Paris 
Conference in January 1923 as the focus of U.S. involvement in European affairs turned away 
from military discussions and arms reductions toward financial and economic concerns, a 
process that led to the Dawes and Young Plans later in the 1920s. 
Although Wilsonian internationalism was rebuffed by both the Senate and segments of 
the press in the years after the First World War, this study shows that it is a mistake to assume 
that the United States adopted an isolationist posture during this period.  It also suggests that, 
even when critical of measures taken by President Wilson, elements of the media did not think of 
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 Hughes was the Republican presidential candidate in 1916.  The Republican Party platform in 1916 was built 
against President Wilson‟s unwillingness to intervene in the European war sooner.   Hughes was an ardent supporter 
of a strong US foreign policy and was named Harding‟s Secretary of State especially for this reason, in Michael E. 
Parrish, Anxious Decades: America in Prosperity and Depression, 1920 -1941 (New York: W.W. Norton & 
Company, 1994), 14-16. 
 13 
themselves as isolationists.  The U.S. continued to increase its global participation during this 
period by actively pursuing its national trade and security objectives abroad, even with Harding‟s 
refusal to join the League of Nations.  Although the government was not prepared to make what 
many leaders believed to be overreaching sacrifices of self-interest by joining an association of 
nations with a preventative and permanent military commitment, the papers examined in this 
study remained confident in the country‟s position as one of the foremost commercial and 
military powers actively seeking to preserve peace throughout the world. 
  
 14 
CHAPTER 1 - From Optimism to Outrage: The Fourteen 
Points and the Rejection of the Treaty of Versailles 
 In January 1918, the United States had been at war with Imperial Germany for 
nearly nine months.  U.S. President Woodrow Wilson had previously extended peace overtures 
to both Entente and Alliance powers since the war‟s outbreak in 1914, but he had not made such 
a proposition since the U.S. entered the conflict on the side of the Allies in April 1917.   In the 
preceding months there had been increased governmental communication for peace negotiations 
coming out of Great Britain while Soviet Russia was preparing to agree to a separate peace 
agreement with Germany.
23
  After four years of war in Europe, ending the war was certainly on 
the minds of the citizens of many countries.  Wilson joined in these peace efforts with the 
declaration of America‟s war objectives in the Fourteen Points.  The Fourteen Points proposal 
was well received by many American newspapers and these papers encouraged a belief that 
Wilson would guide the world into a lasting peace.  When Wilson‟s Fourteen Points were largely 
disregarded by the Allies in the writing of the Treaty of Versailles, some hope for a lasting peace 
dwindled, but the rejection of the treaty by the Senate in November 1919 was not due to the 
abandonment of the Fourteen Points or a growing desire for isolation from the happenings of the 
world.  The treaty and U.S. membership in the League of Nations were rejected in November 
primarily because of President Wilson‟s unwillingness to accept any of the reservations that 
Senators had proposed to the pact. 
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The peace plan which the President thought a lasting peace could be brought about was 
initially received by the press with a sense of enthusiasm and hope.  The hope in the papers was 
for a lasting peace around the world, with a belief that the Great War could be the war to end all 
wars.  The San Francisco Examiner proclaimed: “Wilson Defines U.S. Terms for World Peace.”  
In the article, the paper proclaimed the “14 Conditions Wilson Names as [the] Only Peace 
Basis.”24  An editorial in the Kansas City Star held that these terms differed from what Wilson 
had proposed in earlier addresses, most notably the “peace without victory” speech given in 
January 1917.  The Star reported that “The program removes the chief provocations to war….  
This pronouncement should be…understood as one of war aims rather than peace aims.”25  
Sections of the media praised the President‟s peace program, and noted that it was gathering 
global attention.  The recognition Wilson received in the public and in the press appeared to give 
him a reputation not only as an advocate for Allied victory but also as a spokesman for a just and 
lasting world peace. 
The news coverage of the Fourteen Points also highlighted the growing desire that the 
Allies unify their objectives and prevent Soviet Russia from agreeing to a separate peace.  The 
San Francisco Examiner reported that according to sources obtained from a number of foreign 
ministries “no other incident of the war has so solidified the allies as has to-day‟s address.”26  
The Los Angeles Times wrote that Wilson‟s speech came at the exact “psychological moment” 
when the world needed leadership to unify the Allied cause and deter the “resumption of the 
Brest-Litovsk negotiations by the Russians” with Germany.27  Fear was growing in some of the 
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newspapers examined here that other nations would sue for a separate peace if the Russians did 
indeed bow out of the war with terms that appeared reasonable.  Though reviving the Russian 
war effort under the Bolshevik leadership never materialized, these papers expressed a belief that 
Wilson‟s message could have rallied the Russian people back into the fight. 
Questions persisted about the increasing threat to democracy posed by the authoritarian 
regimes in Germany and Soviet Russia, along with increased censorship and secrecy in the 
Allied nations.  In response to these concerns the New York Herald declared in its headline that 
all Americans should “Hail [the] President‟s Message as [the] Model of Democracy.”  The 
Herald reported that leaders of other countries were ignoring their responsibility to the 
democratic principles that they claimed to have because they would not state their war aims to 
the public as President Wilson had in the Fourteen Points.   The article held that British labor 
groups along with the peoples of other nations were adopting the principles of the Fourteen 
Points and demanding of their leaders the same type of transparency that Wilson had 
demonstrated.  Claiming that American principles, as expressed by President Wilson, were 
superior to those of other countries, the Herald urged European countries to become more like 
the United States.
28
 
With unity within the Allied ranks remaining an important issue in the press, several of 
these newspapers also claimed that the major U.S. political parties were in agreement with the 
President‟s statement as well.  The New York Herald reported, “If there remained any doubt of 
the complete approval with which the country has received the message it has now been 
dissipated.  All political parties and all sections of the country have hailed the President‟s 
statement with acclamation.”29  Nonpartisanship, or at least the semblance of it, was crucial to 
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the promotion of Wilson‟s message.  Astonishingly, even the Herald, a newspaper known for its 
Republican sympathies, endorsed Wilson‟s policy while many Republican leaders were 
questioning how the American war effort had been prosecuted.  The pro-Democratic San 
Francisco Examiner featured comments of support for the Fourteen Points from notable and 
influential Republican Senators like Republican Warren Harding of Ohio and William Borah of 
Idaho.
30
  These articles show the breadth of support for Wilson‟s plan that the press and political 
leaders offered, regardless of partisan affiliation. 
 Bipartisan cooperation was terminated by the congressional elections in November 1918.  
Wilson‟s administration and the Democratic Party came under fire from Republicans for not 
finding a way to deal a final blow to the German war effort.  The New York Times ran editorials 
in support of the President‟s war program in hopes that the Democrats would retain control of the 
House of Representatives and the Senate, which they had held since 1912.  In an article titled 
“The Chief Issue: Support of the President Necessary for a Successful Foreign Policy” the Times 
held that a Democratic Congress was required so that the President‟s influence and strength in 
foreign affairs would not be diminished.
31
  However, this support for Wilson and the Democrats 
did not materialize. 
The vote counts revealed that the Democrats had suffered significant losses throughout 
the country, yielding control of both the House of Representatives and the Senate to the 
Republicans.  This loss of power had significant long-term implications for the President‟s 
ability to push through foreign policy decisions at home, but Wilson was about to receive a 
political boost as the war approached an end.  Late in the evening of 11 November 1919, word 
reached the American press that Germany had negotiated an armistice with the Allies in 
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expectation of a formal end to the war.  The papers used in this study immediately turned to 
President Wilson to champion the United States‟ war objectives in the peace agreement.  The 
New York Herald once again supported the President when it proclaimed that all Americans 
should “forget partisanship in ovation to Wilson” and that the “general verdict in Congress is that 
all American war aims have been achieved.”32   
Several papers hailed Wilson as the moral leader of the Allied cause as well as the man 
who had brought about peace.  An editorial in the San Francisco Examiner proclaimed that:  
It is our great President to whom they [the leaders of Europe] have looked since our 
entry into the war for moral guidance, and it is to him they still look, more than any 
other man, to work out the plan for the world‟s political salvation….There is no 
prouder title in the world now than the title of American Citizenship.
33
 
 
The paper not only praised Wilson as the deliverer of peace but also applauded the American 
people because of their determination, ingenuity, and democratic idealism.  Other papers shared 
the belief that Wilson would lead the world to a lasting peace.  The New York Herald reported 
that “President Wilson‟s Statements [the Fourteen Points] Regarded as Offering Basis for Allies‟ 
Decisions.”  The article went on to assert that the president‟s influence abroad was growing and 
surely the leaders of France and Great Britain would recognize that the U.S. government‟s 
solution was the only way to establish a righteous peace.
34
 
The promotion of democracy in Europe became a major point of concern within this 
select group of papers.  Even before the cease fire was signed, the New York Times published an 
editorial written by Idaho Senator William Borah that highlighted what he believed would be the 
main concerns in dealing with Germany after the war.  Borah claimed that “we [Americans] are 
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deeply concerned in our own security, and have been compelled to take an interest in the world‟s 
security – therefore we would be recreant to duty if we did not treat with these and those 
[nations] alone who can give some assurances that their treaties will be observed.”35  Borah 
concluded that unless the German people withdrew their support from aristocratic and militaristic 
leaders they would not be able to participate in new international organizations, such as the 
proposed League of Nations. 
Germany was not the only nation targeted for the spread of democracy; the situation in 
Russia was also on the minds of many editorial writers.  The New York Herald published an 
editorial titled “America the Sole Hope For Russia‟s Restoration.”  The article reported that 
“Seldom is it given to a people to develop a continent….  To us of America, however, this great 
privilege has been given; our task now is on the way to completion; and we have profited much.”  
The Herald asserted that the United States had a duty use the skills acquired when developing 
North America to help the Russians realize the potential of their massive nation.
36
  The Herald 
alleged that the United States would be best fit to rebuild Russia because it could not have 
“political designs” on her like the European powers, and the U.S. would bring the Russians up to 
their own level of prosperity through fair trade practices and democratic government. 
To ensure the spread of American democratic principles several media outlets began a 
campaign to support the President‟s planned attendance of the Paris peace conference.  As of 
1918 no President had ever traveled to another continent while in office.  The San Francisco 
Examiner made the event front-page news with a headline reading “Wilson Urged to go to 
Europe.”  The article asserted that summons from the Allied powers as well as the newly formed 
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democratic German government required Wilson to come, take the lead in the peace 
negotiations, and restore order to the chaotic European scene.
37
  The Los Angeles Times also 
hailed Wilson‟s willingness to break precedent by planning a European tour but posed questions 
of executive power when Wilson would be away.  Since no one knew what the protocol would 
be for a president spending much time away from the continent, the paper suggested that Vice-
President Thomas Marshall might assume the position as chief executive, but this idea was 
frowned upon even by the Times.  The article also foreshadowed future problems for the Wilson 
administration.  Well known Republican politician Elihu Root was included in the list of 
representatives the Times expected to be included in the U.S. delegation going to France.
38
  Root 
was a former Senator, Secretary of War for Presidents McKinley and Roosevelt, and Secretary of 
State under Roosevelt.  He had also been dispatched by President Wilson to Europe in 1917 to 
aid and build support for Alexander Kerensky‟s Provisional Government in Russia.  The 
eventual exclusion of Root and any other prominent Republican from the American delegation in 
Paris led to much ill will between the Grand Old Party leadership and Wilson‟s administration. 
When President Wilson arrived in France in December 1918 he and the American 
military leaders who accompanied him received an ovation unlike any other in recent memory.  
According to the Los Angeles Times, many Europeans hailed Wilson as the messenger of 
humanitarianism and the man who would forge a lasting peace.  This reception was covered with 
much fanfare in many American papers.  The Times reported that the papers in Paris, Rome, and 
Madrid all praised Wilson when he came to Europe, referring to him as “the most humane man 
of the century.”39  The New York Herald reprinted a British newspaper story that praised 
Wilson‟s international influence in an article titled “Precedents Fall When President Starts to 
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Work.”  The article asserted that Wilson‟s energy and diligence guaranteed the answers to 
questions and solutions to problems that other European leaders, especially the French, could not 
provide.
40
  Wilson‟s positive reception abroad spread optimism at home about how he would 
help achieve peace in Europe. 
Several newspapers expanded their commentary on the President‟s role as all eyes 
became fixed on events leading up to the Paris gathering.  The San Francisco Examiner 
proclaimed Wilson to be the “ONE MAN to make the first draft of the final peace,” and it 
speculated that he would be chosen to lead the world into a time of peace “by an overwhelming 
popular vote” at the conference.41  A story published by the Los Angeles Times called Wilson the 
“Caesar of America.”  The author proclaimed that the President had been “cheerfully granted 
autocratic powers for the time being by an enormous, powerful and wealthy people.”42  Wilson‟s 
status abroad was matched by support from the press at home.  Many of the papers examined 
here believed that the Allied powers would come to an agreement based on Wilson‟s Fourteen 
Points. 
Of the Fourteen Points, the proposal for a “general association of nations” received 
significant attention in several papers before the start of the peace conference in France.  The 
New York Times established itself as one the League of Nations‟ biggest supporters.  The Times 
published three articles in its 22 December 1918 edition that reflected the enthusiasm the paper 
had for the League.  A front-page story focused on Wilson‟s message that an international 
dialogue “Would Have Averted War.”  Many League supporters believed, like Wilson, that 
discussion and international arbitration could have solved the Serbian problem that triggered the 
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outbreak of the war in 1914.  Miscommunication between the European powers certainly played 
a role in the outbreak of the war, but many policy makers and civic leaders also believed that 
more would have been needed than just a place of communication.  Some League supporters 
believed that sacrifices of self-interest and secrecy also needed to be made by the nations of the 
world to ensure an enduring peace.
43
 
The second Times editorial advocating the establishment of an international association 
attempted to draw a comparison between the forming of the U.S. and the proposed League of 
Nations.  The author claimed that “the United States and the Allies have been in a league of 
friendship similar to that of the colonies up to the adoption of the Article of Confederation, since 
the United States entered this war, and that league is in existence at this moment.”  The author 
asserted that the Allied governments should enhance their relationship and create a more formal 
union.  While this was an inaccurate comparison between the past and the present, the piece 
reflected the desire of some members of the media to see the creation of a League of Nations.
44
 
The third Times article was written by President Darwin Kingsley of New York Life 
Insurance, an active supporter of Woodrow Wilson‟s policies.  Kingsley made a case for a “close 
federation instead of a loose League of Nations in order to safeguard [the] world‟s future.”45  He 
stated that the Allies, having won a “complete victory over the enemies of ordered liberty,” were 
responsible to fix the errors of the political system by changing the structure of international 
relations.  He claimed that the way to achieve a lasting peace was through a union of nations who 
do not view all others as enemies but as “partners” in the most important of matters, collective 
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security and prosperity.  Kingsley clearly believed that collective security and prosperity were 
possible only through an international league of cooperation.
46
 
Though several of these selected newspapers held high hopes for the League, there was 
also growing dissent in the other papers to Wilson‟s proposal. In an article titled “Lodge Assails 
Wilson‟s Aims,” the Los Angeles Times reported that Massachusetts Senator Henry Cabot Lodge 
was building resistance to Wilson‟s peace program with a particular focus on the proposed 
military and political commitments required for membership in the League of Nations.  The 
article highlighted Lodge‟s main questions surrounding the nature of the League and how much 
the United States would have to change its policies, particularly the Monroe Doctrine.
47
  Many 
Republicans feared that increased international and diplomatic commitments under Wilson‟s lead 
might diminish Congressional authority and could disregard long standing national interests. 
The Kansas City Star published an editorial questioning the plans for the League, too.  
The editorial, titled “League of Nations a Snag,” chronicled early opposition to the League from 
English and French leaders.  The article asserted that there was support in Europe for increased 
American involvement on the continent, but those same Europeans did not want to cede any 
power without adequate guarantees of safety from aggressors.
48
 
When the Versailles peace conference opened in January 1919 the first issue on the 
Allied agenda was the formation of a League.  The Kansas City Star called the League of 
Nations the “Big Issue” that needed to be sorted out first before the finer details of the peace 
treaty could be worked out between the Allied powers.
49
  The San Francisco Examiner held that 
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Wilson‟s program should be “adopted as [the] basis for negotiations” at the peace conference.50  
To many in the media the belief that Wilson‟s principles and the league concept were to serve as 
the basis for the peace settlement was a matter of national pride and honor. 
Americans were not alone in hoping for Wilson‟s message to prevail upon the other 
Allies.  Some of these newspapers claimed that the German government also hoped that the 
Allies would pursue the President‟s peace terms.  An article in the Los Angeles Times claimed 
that the “German delegation will oppose demands of the Allies which go beyond the programme 
outlined by Wilson.”  Hope for a peace based on Wilsonian principles seemed to radiate into 
both sides of the trenches at this point.  Also, there was clear German recognition, echoed in the 
Times, that an excessively punitive peace agreement would hinder not just Germany but global 
markets as well.
51
 
The U.S. public and politicians were still very much focused on forging a workable 
League of Nations, and many Republicans had crossed party lines to support the President‟s call 
for such an international organization.  Several newspapers in this study presented bipartisan 
support not just for any international organization but for a strong alliance including security 
commitments among world powers to which the U.S. would furnish significant military support.  
The Los Angeles Times ran an editorial from former President William Howard Taft, then leader 
of the League to Enforce Peace, an organization he established to work towards establishing a 
lasting world peace.  Taft stated that the larger powers would provide a police force for the 
League, while the “safety and security of the lesser nations, which cannot be expected to share to 
burden of military contribution, will be found in the judgments of an impartial international 
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court.”  Taft specifically desired a strong commitment from the United States to provide military 
aid to an international league.
52
 
Even with Taft‟s support, Wilson still came under attack from Congressional Republicans 
two weeks into the peace negotiations.  One of the foremost complaints, according to the Los 
Angeles Times, was that the President was violating his own Fourteen Points by not 
communicating with members of the Republican-dominated Senate about the peace negotiations.  
Republican Senator Hiram Johnson of California denounced the president for violating his “first 
peace principle,” which was for “open diplomacy” as the basis for effective communication 
between powers.  Johnson‟s statements ironically reflected his strong belief in the Fourteen Point 
program itself, though he used its logic to attack its author.  The Times claimed that Senator 
Johnson and others in Congress mentioned in the article expected Wilson to champion the 
Fourteen Points in Paris, not just as his own message but that of the American people.
53
 
By May 1919, the Allied powers faced another crisis as the Italian government disputed 
claims to Fiume and the Dalmatian coast.  The Kansas City Star published an editorial from 
political observer and regular contributor Frank Simonds that addressed the growing tension with 
Italy.  Simonds argued that Italy‟s claim to Dalmatia could not be considered because the 
agreement it had made with France and Great Britain was no longer valid due to the United 
States‟ entry into the war.  Although territorial acquisition of the coast was Italy‟s prime reason 
for entering the war, the Allied powers could no longer simply award it in good faith.  The 
Italians did not like the fact that they would not receive the territory they believed was theirs, and 
Simonds declared that the controversy with Italy was just another example of a “peace built on 
compromises.”  The author asserted that “in the past five months shock after shock between Mr. 
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Wilson‟s conceptions of peace under the League of Nations and the European conception of 
peace based upon historical traditions and geographical conditions” had led to a lack of 
understanding of the “doctrine of the League of Nations.”  To Simonds, Italy‟s complaint 
demonstrated how Allied powers had gotten away from a just peace treaty based on the Fourteen 
Points.  Some members of the press were growing concerned that the peace settlement would 
produce little that was different from the ways the Europeans would conduct politics.
54
 
Later that May the German government received a draft of the proposed peace terms.  
The San Francisco Examiner quickly pointed out that Wilson‟s Fourteen Points had been largely 
ignored in Paris by publishing the claims of one U.S. Senator who stated: “How any man can 
read the summary of the treaty and still think it was based upon the high principles for which 
President Wilson said we went to war is beyond all understanding.”  The article reported that the 
United States had no obligation to agree to peace terms that did not reflect American principles.  
Some newspapers were beginning to feel uncomfortable about supporting the League of Nations 
and the treaty which were about to be drafted.  However, not all papers were pessimistic about 
the terms.
55
 
The New York Times published an editorial contribution from influential Republican 
politician Henry Stimson who argued that America‟s international reputation was on the line 
with the Treaty of Versailles.  Stimson claimed that the President was being unfairly attacked by 
the press because “the burdens that have been upon him are quite unequal to any his predecessors 
have borne, and, in the main, have involved vaster and more complicated issues.”  According to 
Stimson, the country must decide “whether we shall destroy our prestige in the eyes of a world 
weary of war or live up to the reputation for unselfish and honorable character which has been 
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won for us by the splendid service of our troops and the unanimity of the patriotic ardor that sent 
them forth.”56  In the opinion of Stimson and the sympathetic Times, the United States needed to 
accept the peace pact Wilson had brokered to prove the nation‟s prestige to the Allies and the 
world.   
The Hearst newspaper empire was clearly opposed to the Treaty, regularly featuring 
editorials from its publisher and owner William Randolph Hearst.  The San Francisco Examiner 
published one of Hearst‟s editorials, titled “America Has Won for England the Hegemony of 
World,” upon the announcement of the Treaty of Versailles‟s terms.   He attacked the treaty for 
making “England mistress of the world.”  Hearst claimed that “the United States has the 
satisfaction of having won the greatest war in the history of the world after it had been lost by the 
Allies; but England has the material advantage of immense increases in territory, of the complete 
control of the seas, and of a very much enlarged relative position of power and importance 
among the nations of the world.”  He contended that “we [America] should keep free of foreign 
alliances and the expensive and exhausting conflicts which such alliances are almost sure to 
precipitate….  America is the most idealistic, the most altruistic nation in the world, and America 
should lead the world for the benefit of the world.”  Hearst was particularly harsh toward Britain, 
claiming its leaders had manipulated the treaty to strengthen the British Empire‟s position over 
the other Allies.
57
 
The commentary in the Kansas City Star echoed some of Hearst‟s concerns about the 
terms of the treaty while also suggesting the need for some kind of international association.   
The Star reported that several Senators were suggesting a policy which placed the United States 
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in a “Triple Entente” with France and Great Britain rather than agreeing to Article X of the 
League covenant, which pledged military support to resist and reverse any unwarranted 
aggression against League members.  The problem, according to the Star, was that a simple 
alliance of so many nations could not possibly protect the interests of all nations involved.  The 
Star sensed that the Senate would not accept the treaty as it existed and that changes were 
needed.
58
  Several of the newspapers examined for this study, including the Star, remained 
hopeful that President Wilson would be willing to consider mild changes the treaty terms to 
make a more agreeable association of nations a possibility. 
The Kansas City Star ran an editorial from Frank Simonds that addressed some of the 
growing concerns over the League of Nations and the political situation in Europe.  Simonds 
claimed that the League “represented before all else the conviction of the President and those 
Americans who share his views that all men of all nations, without regard to the new gospel, vow 
to overturn their governments if their governments refused to heed the new voice and pursued 
the old pathways.”  Simonds added that the “last four months have demonstrated that the peoples 
of Europe quite as much, and perhaps more than their governments, are controlled by old 
conceptions of national unity, political security, individual economic existence, and 
development.”59  Simonds‟s continued support for the President and condemnation of the 
political scene in Europe were not uncommon among observers at this time.  Many papers 
examined here still viewed the President as the ideological and moral leader who would 
hopefully lead the world to lasting peace.  The Treaty of Versailles and the politicians of Europe 
were becoming unpopular in segments of the American press.  
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In June, the Allied heads of state finalized the Treaty of Versailles and animosity toward 
the pact came out of the U.S. Capitol, led by Pennsylvania Senator Philander Knox.  The Kansas 
City Star sympathetically highlighted the amendments proposed by Senator Knox.  The 
Senator‟s primary concern with the treaty was that Wilson wanted the Senate to immediately 
accept both it and membership in the League of Nations without debate.  The Star claimed that 
the treaty-making power of the Senate must not be neglected in such an important document, 
which could reshape the way the U.S. participated in world affairs.  The article also supported 
Knox‟s claims that the treaty did not make peace secure and was “destructive of human progress 
and liberty” because it did not protect popular sovereignty.60 
The New York Times was quick to use its editorial page to defend the President against 
Knox‟s attacks.  The Times published an editorial from a well known fiction author, historian, 
and Republican from Pittsburgh, Samuel Harden Church.  Harden backed the treaty and 
challenged fellow Pennsylvania Republican Philander Knox‟s opposition to the President.  
Church claimed that the “League of Nations is not only necessary in the prevention of future 
wars but it is indispensible in the enforcement of the present peace.”  In response to the 
naysayers, he stated that: 
it is a shocking disappointment, therefore, when the world is still in flames, and when 
the organization of peace and justice is coming to its slow but logical conclusion, to 
find Senator Knox using the prestige of his eloquence and reputation to accomplish 
the certain destruction of all the great work that has been done at Paris during the last 
six months.
61
   
 
Church‟s editorial showed that a certain amount of bipartisan enthusiasm still remained for 
Wilson‟s efforts to bring about a lasting peace through the treaty and membership in the League 
of Nations. 
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Support for the Treaty of Versailles did not just come from pro-Democratic papers like 
the New York Times.  The Los Angeles Times joined the defense of the treaty with an editorial 
from William Howard Taft.  Taft tried to rally his party‟s skeptics to support the League with a 
reference to past foreign policy achievements by Republican leaders:  
Then, too, we heard much of the radical departure from our traditional American 
policy of isolation and the surrender of the Monroe Doctrine.  But the Republican 
Party, recognizing its world responsibilities, and with courage born of past 
achievements, and with a traditional constructive ability and energy, carried its 
Philippine policy through and the awful prophecies of ruin are forgotten.
62
 
 
Taft also tried to remind the Republican dissenters of the party‟s reputation for 
participating in world affairs, which had been the hallmarks of his and Theodore 
Roosevelt‟s administrations.  He claimed that support widespread partisan support for 
Senator Knox‟s resolution would be neglecting their party‟s legacy. The former President 
recommended patience with the treaty.
63
  Also, Taft‟s article exhibited a message of 
bipartisanship and belief that accepting the treaty would ultimately benefit the nation 
more than refusing to do so. 
The Los Angeles Times was not alone in expressing support for the President and the 
treaty.  Two editorials from the New York Times and Kansas City Star illustrate the typical 
commentaries that were being published in support of President Wilson.  Several newspapers 
supported the treaty by alleging that Wilson had done as well as could be expected when dealing 
with the old world politicians of Europe.  George Wickersham, Attorney General in the Taft 
administration, writing in the Times, asserted that the Republican objectors were “not willing to 
recognize any responsibility in America for the future preservation of world peace,” while 
Wilson and his Democratic administration were doing their best to represent the moral 
                                                 
62
 William Howard Taft, “Blow at G.O.P. in Treaty Fight,” Los Angeles Times, 22 June 1919, 2. 
63
 Ibid. 
 31 
perspective in the negotiations.
64
  Frank Simonds, writing in the Star, claimed that “Mr. Wilson 
believed when he arrived in Europe that the people of all Allied countries would support him and 
his fourteen points against their governments….  There came a time, then, when Mr. Wilson had 
to choose between the best he could and coming home and leaving Europe to fight it out.”  
Simonds argued that: 
Wilson‟s gravest mistake lay in his original misapprehension of the real facts.  He 
thought, he believed, that there would be a peace of conciliation.  He believed the 
mass of the plain people of the world were prepared to make any sacrifice to bring 
about peace and he believed that the fourteen points and the League of Nations would 
take care of everything.
65
 
 
Simonds shared Wickersham‟s and Taft‟s assertions that this peace was better than a 
continuation of the war, which would certainly damage world commercial markets and political 
systems more than it already had. 
As Wilson returned from Paris to present the treaty and League covenant to Congress, 
some of the newspapers hoped that the Senators would understand the President‟s call for 
urgency.  The New York Times’ editorial page was littered with letters of unfettered support for 
the quick ratification of the treaty and the League of Nations.  The letters proclaimed that the 
Senate should permit Wilson a free hand in the matter and approve the treaty as he asked.
66
  
Support for both the peace agreement and the passage of the unaltered League pact by the Senate 
also came from the Los Angeles Times, which proclaimed that Wilson “pleads for acceptance of 
international leadership” while claiming that there was a “universal demand for [the] League of 
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Nations.”67  Both papers saw limited compromise as a possibility, but overwhelmingly their 
editorials expressed hope that the Senators would retract their earlier threats against amending or 
rejecting the treaty. 
In July, a surprising twist occurred in the editorials published by the San Francisco 
Examiner.  The Examiner, which had up to this point balanced its loyalty to the President 
because he was a Democrat and its opposition to the treaty, launched a personal attack against 
Wilson. In one of his personal editorials in the paper, William Randolph Hearst argued that the 
Treaty of Versailles was not the only issue that concerned him; his distrust had begun to run 
deeper.  He accused Wilson of being a liar because of his 1916 campaign promise to continue 
keeping the United States out of the Great War.  Then, five months after winning his second term 
in the White House, Wilson declared war against Germany and plunged America into a fight that 
was, according to Hearst, not to its own benefit.  Hearst added, “In campaigning for his League 
of Nations Mr. Wilson declares with great positiveness that the adoption of the League is the 
only way to keep us out of war.  If this were true, everybody would be for the League.”68  In the 
article Hearst expressed his belief in the Fourteen Points, but he agreed with the dissenting 
Republican leaders that the treaty did not guarantee an end of war for the United States or the 
world.  His continued belief in the original Fourteen Points and Wilson‟s abandonment of those 
principles at the peace conference left Hearst and others like him feeling betrayed. 
The Senate Foreign Relations Committee under the leadership of Henry Cabot Lodge 
wanted more time to review the Treaty of Versailles in general and the issue of League 
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membership in particular.  The treaty and League membership were presented to the Senate as a 
package deal.  Acceptance of the peace agreement meant automatic participation in the world 
association.  In September, Wilson decided to take his proposal directly to the people of the 
United States with a nationwide train tour.  However, he was not the only one appealing to the 
public.  Ex-president Taft was busy writing editorials in support of the treaty, some of which 
appeared in the Los Angeles Times.  In his commentary on the treaty, Taft claimed that the 
“League is necessary to enforce the peace” and that Lodge‟s main claims against the treaty were 
unwarranted because “unlimited power was not conferred upon the alliance.”  He also reassured 
readers that the Monroe Doctrine would not be disregarded and, more importantly, the 
Constitution would not be overstepped at any instance.
69
  With editorials like this and others in 
pro-treaty newspapers, the major points of disagreement over ratification of the peace pact began 
to take shape. 
Some papers hesitated to become too excited about the President‟s tour.  The Kansas City 
Star, while pleased that the President was going to be making many stops in the Midwest, 
remained skeptical of the proposed treaty.  One editorial was titled “Wilson to Deal in Facts,” 
and that was exactly what the piece called for.  The article applauded the President‟s desire to 
debate the exact obligations of the treaty and League of Nations.  However, the author remained 
suspicious because of Wilson‟s desire for an unquestioning acceptance of the unaltered treaty.70  
The article in the Star expressed hope that the peace settlement could be worked out between the 
President and Senate opposition.  However, cordial meetings and pleasantries between opposing 
sides on the treaty would not last. 
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By month‟s end Wilson was no longer on his stumping campaign.  On 25 September 
1919, he collapsed while giving a speech at Pueblo, Colorado.   Admiral Cary T. Grayson, 
Wilson‟s personal physician, ordered an end to the President‟s national tour.  Later, it was 
discovered that Wilson had suffered a severe stroke, but at this time no one outside the 
President‟s immediate circle knew the specifics of the illness.  The cancellation of the tour and 
uncertainty about the extent of the President‟s illness further complicated the debate.  Wilson 
limited (and in some instances discontinued altogether) communication with opponents of the 
treaty and increased his resolve in the belief that the American people desperately wanted the 
treaty to pass without interference from Congress.  In the press, concerns arose about how the 
debate between the Senate Republicans and the administration was being viewed in the United 
States and Europe.
71
 
Unease over the President‟s illness and its effect on the dispute over the treaty made 
headlines in the New York Times.  The Times reported that Wilson‟s “physical condition will 
have, of course, a bearing on the matter to the degree that he will or will not be able to participate 
in the effort of his senatorial supporters to have the treaty and the League of Nations ratified 
without amendment or even interpretive reservations.”  The article claimed that Wilson‟s tour 
was a tremendous success and expressed confidence that the President was in excellent health, 
and would be back in Washington shortly to lead the campaign for ratification.  The editorial 
continued to criticize the Republicans for dangerously wasting their political popularity over the 
issue.
72
  Because he was the treaty‟s greatest champion, Wilson‟s questionable health directly 
affected the treaty‟s future in Congress.  Papers like the Times attempted to conjure sympathy 
and continued to support the President, his message, and the treaty. 
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The growing distaste for the President‟s message was evident in the editorials of several 
papers.  The San Francisco Examiner continued to criticize the President and the treaty in an 
editorial titled “Surely This Great Matter of the Treaty should be Debated Only with Utmost 
Candor and Honesty.”  The paper attacked Wilson and the other Allied leaders, alleging that at 
the Paris peace conference the Fourteen Points “flew out the window and never came back.”  
The editorial claimed that the “terms of the treaty do not make certain the destruction of 
autocratic powers,” but the terms “make the power and despotic authority of the Japanese 
autocracy PERMANENT.”  The piece also criticized Wilson‟s earlier promise to free all people 
from oppression, claiming that the treaty and the League of Nations “MAKE PERMANENT the 
subjugation of the oppressed peoples of Ireland, India, Egypt, Persia, Syria, Korea, Shantung, 
and all those other smaller territories which have been torn from their fatherlands.”  Throughout 
the editorial, the author called the League the “British League of Nations” because of the 
perceived advantage it provided for the preservation and protection of the British Empire.  The 
Examiner article also attacked President Wilson when it stated that “He hurts his own reputation 
and makes the country feel uncomfortable and embarrassed” because the paper believed him to 
be unaware of how the specifics of the treaty would affect the nation‟s autonomy in the long run.  
Even as it was tearing apart the treaty and the League programs, the article remained adamant 
that the United States had a duty to bring only American principles of liberty and democracy to 
people around the world.
73
 
The Kansas City Star‟s editorial page expressed serious concern regarding international 
reaction to the treaty fight in the U.S.  Frank Simonds claimed that the actions of Italy and 
France were and would continue to be “entirely dependent upon the course of the United States 
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Senate in adopting or rejecting the treaty of alliance.”  As long as the Senate wavered, according 
to Simonds, the peace process would continue to “de-Americanize,” leading to decreased U.S. 
credibility internationally as well as to an increase in the chaos already spreading into war-torn 
France, Belgium, Germany, and other Balkan countries.
74
  Other editorials like this one claimed 
that U.S. delay in approving the treaty was negatively affecting the world, which was supposedly 
waiting for American aid for the reconstruction process. 
In November, many papers that had previously supported the uncompromised acceptance 
of the treaty and membership in the League began to urge the administration to compromise.  
The Los Angeles Times published an editorial from William Howard Taft, who addressed the 
group known as “irreconcilables” in Congress and their reservations, specifically the amendment 
presented by Missouri Senator James A. Reed, a Democrat.  Reed had proposed that all matters 
up for general League discussion be subject to U.S. approval before they could be openly 
debated in conference.  Taft claimed that “Senator Reed‟s bitter opposition to the whole treaty is 
well known, and this reservation is, in effect, a repudiation of the treaty, both in spirit and 
substance.”  Taft explained that at least the “other reservations leave a most valuable advance in 
the matter of international arrangements to avoid war.”  Taft stated that “the reservations leave a 
great deal that is most valuable in the treaty.  It will be yielding to politics and personal feelings 
for the Democrats to kill so much of a good for the world.”75 
The New York Times also published editorials urging the Senate and administration to 
work out a deal on the treaty.  One editorial stated that “seventy-five members of the Senate who 
wanted some kind of treaty ought to be liberal enough to come to an agreement whereby they 
can put the treaty through and not allow their wishes for a treaty and a League to be defeated” by 
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fewer than twenty Senators who were against the treaty altogether.  The author also proclaimed 
that “from the present outlook, in order to bring about a compromise, the broadest concessions 
must be made by the President.”76  Clearly, as shown in Taft‟s shift in position and the New York 
Times editorial on the topic, many in the press believed that the acceptance of some form of 
Versailles Treaty was desirable.  Even with significant bipartisan support for both League of 
Nations membership and some form of treaty, Wilson was still unwilling to consider 
compromise. 
When the Treaty of Versailles failed to pass the Senate both with and without 
reservations in mid-November several papers, like the Kansas City Star, placed the blame 
squarely on President Wilson.  Front-page headlines in the Star proclaimed “Treaty is Defeated” 
and “Blame on Wilson.”  The latter Star article reported:  
Responsibility for the defeat of the Peace Treaty and League of Nations by the United 
States Senate tonight rests squarely with President Wilson for it was the votes of the 
Democratic senators, obeying his orders, that gave it its death blow. 
The last two votes taken in the historic fight tell the story – two of the [most] 
momentous ever cast in the Senate chamber – told the story.  On the final vote on the 
resolution with the Lodge reservations, the senate stood 41 for, 51 against.  Of the 
fifty-one against only thirteen were Republican anti-leaguers, two were Democratic 
anti-leaguers, and thirty-six were Democrats supposed to be friendly to the league but 
voting against it because some of the changes did not suit the President…. 
The country probably will never hear the end of passing of the blame back and forth 
as to who really did the “killing.”  President Wilson unquestionably will issue a 
statement tomorrow denouncing the treaty foes in the Senate and Senators on both 
sides were busy tonight on their last speeches setting forth their cases to the country. 
There are two sides to the argument, of course.  But in the last analysis, in the closing 
hours tonight, when the vote the whole world was waiting for was being taken, the 
fact stood out that the peace pact and the league were going down to defeat because 
of the President‟s unwillingness to accept two changes that had been made in the 
pact.
77
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Similar statements, citing the President‟s unwillingness to compromise as the reason for the 
treaty‟s defeat appeared in the New York Times and Los Angeles Times, too.78  In the debate that 
had captured a significant amount of the these papers‟ attention for months, Wilson had become 
the main factor preventing the passage, albeit in altered form, of the Treaty of Versailles and 
membership in the League of Nations. 
Even though the treaty had not passed the Senate either with or without reservations, a 
discussion about further American international participation was hardly over.  The New York 
Times reported that “Without a compromise the treaty fight is likely to go over into the next 
Presidential campaign as the central issue.”79 In an article titled “Treaty to be Issue in Next Big 
Campaign,” the San Francisco Examiner added that “mild reservationists may be persuaded to 
accept compromise on ratification…but they [democratic leaders] have small hopes of making it 
successful” without Wilson‟s support.  The article concluded with an expression of hope that the 
war would finally end the way it had begun, with a “joint resolution” from the “constitutional 
authority of Senators.”80 
Throughout the entire period leading up to the defeat of the Treaty of Versailles in the 
U.S. Senate, Wilson had been the face of the peace treaty and American international relations.  
However, Senate opposition to the Treaty of Versailles and unqualified membership in the 
League of Nations was not based on isolationist sentiments.  The majority of Senators, as shown 
in the articles and editorials above, believed that the treaty was acceptable on most points and 
that membership in the League would be advantageous to American foreign policy.  Even the 
most adamant opponents of the treaty and the League, such as William Randolph Hearst, were 
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not opposed to participation in world affairs.  In one editorial before the Senate votes in 
November, Hearst expressed sincere concern over the treaty because he believed it granted too 
much power and authority to Great Britain and Japan, while continental nations like France and 
Italy were left in “utter ruin” by the terms.81  Also, the voting in the Senate showed that the 
irreconcilables, who refused any type of international pact, had little effect on the result.   
The treaty ultimately failed in November 1919 because Wilson had poorly negotiated the 
political situation that confronted him in the preceding months.  First, when negotiating the peace 
treaty it was apparent that he and the Allies had abandoned the Fourteen Points, which many in 
the American press believed was the only just plan for the war‟s outcome.  Wilson sacrificed a 
good measure of political credibility at home in making concessions to get European leaders to 
accept the League of Nations as a major objective.  Second, Wilson‟s failure to negotiate with 
the Republican leadership in the Senate played a crucial role in the President‟s defeat.  Wilson 
failed to focus on the politics of the possible when a potential coalition, at the low cost of slight 
compromises, presented itself. 
By the end of 1919 the optimism and hope that had surrounded Wilson and his Fourteen 
Point program had been squandered.  The moral arguments that had carried the United States to 
war and into the Paris peace conference were now gone, but a message of isolationism did not 
arise.  Even thought Wilson had rallied popular support for membership in the League of Nations 
and an increased role for the U.S. in international affairs, the primary problem remained that he 
was unable and unwilling to recognize the need for occasional compromises to the nuances of 
domestic politics.  Even though these papers did not appreciate Wilson‟s stubbornness, they did 
not begin circulating a message of isolationism.  Actually, in these papers there was plenty of 
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active discussion in editorials on how the United States should conduct international affairs and 
there was no mention of withdrawing American support or interest from Europe and the rest of 
the world. 
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CHAPTER 2 - Continued American Internationalism and 
the 1920 Election 
 The November defeats in the Senate did not mean the end of the Treaty of 
Versailles.  Due to the determination of both President Wilson and the reservationists in the 
Senate, ratification of the treaty and membership in the League of Nations remained volatile 
issues throughout 1920, not just because of the November elections, but also because there was a 
definite concern over the ways in which the country would continue to participate in world 
affairs.  The continuing debate between supporters of the unaltered treaty and the reservationists 
played a significant role in developing the shape and style of United States foreign policy well 
into the November election.  A survey of several press outlets‟ coverage of the campaign 
presents the election as a choice between differing visions of how the United States should 
participate in world affairs.  The country was to choose either the Democratic plan with 
membership in the League of Nations or the Republican approach that focused on maintaining 
multiple avenues of diplomatic activity with the countries of the world.   
In January, Great Britain, France and Italy ratified the Treaty of Versailles, formally 
establishing the League of Nations.  Most of the media outlets looked at in this study continued 
to believe that some form of compromise over the treaty could be reached in the U.S., even after 
the defeat it had suffered in November the previous year.  The New York Times published a 
lengthy editorial from American diplomat in Europe and author Isaac Marcosson in support of 
the treaty.  Marcosson argued that the commercial instability in Europe in 1920 was the result of 
“the flat failure of the United States to ratify the treaty and clear the deck for real stabilization.”  
He blamed President Wilson as well as Senator Lodge for diminishing the global prestige of the 
United States, saying that both were needlessly delaying the nation‟s acceptance of the pact.  
 42 
Marcosson remained hopeful that a settlement and quick ratification of the treaty would be 
possible.  The covenant, as far as he was concerned, was an imperfect, yet necessary, step in 
reversing the “desperate situation” developing in Europe.  He concluded that the Treaty of 
Versailles should be agreed upon in the Senate or else the U.S. would be left settling on less 
satisfactory grounds with Germany at a later date, which would lead to certain “world ruin.”82 
Editorials in the Los Angeles Times also proposed that the treaty might be agreed upon in 
the near future.  These sentiments showed themselves in two editorials, the first by the paper‟s 
own editorial board and the second by former-President Taft.  The first editorial claimed that 
Wilson had misjudged the popular support for the unaltered treaty.  The editorial read: “The 
Times fully agrees with the mild reservationists in the Senate, and with Taft and other eminent 
Americans outside it, that the objection to the reservations was removed when the Allies 
announced that they were perfectly willing to accept them.”  The Times also asked the 
Republican-dominated Senate to approve the ratification promptly with reservations and let 
Wilson shoulder the burden for neglecting the nation‟s global responsibilities.83  The 
Republicans, according to the Times, were actively seeking a way to work around the President 
either to get their way or else to allow the entire blame for failure to ratify the treaty to settle on 
him. 
In the second article, former President Taft scolded both Wilson and Lodge for their 
actions.  Taft proclaimed that neither had the support of the people, and he asserted that 
overwhelming support was for mild reservations to the treaty and League covenants.  Also, Taft 
accused the two men of placing “politics above the benefit of solving the present exigency for 
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the country and the world.”84  Taft‟s words suggest that the ratification of an amended peace 
agreement and membership in the League of Nations were both possible and were looked upon 
favorably by many in 1920.  Now, what Taft and others needed was the Senate to reconsider the 
treaty and Wilson, along with his Senate supporters, to agree on some form of concession. 
In March, a movement to debate the treaty again took shape in the Senate, this time with 
the help of nationally known Democratic Party figure William Jennings Bryan.  Bryan brought to 
the table the support from moderates and progressives in both parties in hopes of working out a 
deal.  The Kansas City Star asserted that the “Great Commoner,” as Bryan was affectionately 
nicknamed, would enter the treaty debate bringing some common sense and the ability to forge 
an alliance, focusing on the Democratic Senators who followed the orders of the President in 
November.  The article stated that “After a day of consultations with Democratic senators the 
Commoner was confident that he would win in his contest with the White House, and thereby 
repeat his feat of 1899 when he saved the peace treaty with Spain from the defeat by the 
Democrats.”85  The Star hoped that with Bryan‟s help the country would finally and formally be 
at peace. 
The New York Herald expressed hope that Wilson and the Democrats would seek a 
compromise with the reservationist Republicans.  The Herald claimed that Wilson‟s 
unwillingness to allow any concessions on the military commitment clause of the League of 
Nations covenant, Article X, would likely seal the failure of the Treaty of Versailles.  The 
Herald urged a compromise but reported that Wilson had refused to set aside any more time to 
                                                 
84
 William Howard Taft, “Taft Demands a Bi-Partisan Defeat of Wilson and Lodge,” Los Angeles Times, 12 January 
1920, 1. 
85
 “Bryan Fights for Treaty,” Kansas City Times, 18 March 1920, 3. 
 44 
discuss his reasons for not bending on the terms of the treaty.
86
  It is very likely that Wilson‟s 
illness was one of his prime motivations for pushing the treaty ahead without giving regard to the 
Senators‟ concerns.  In an accompanying article, featuring commentary from former German 
Ambassador to the U.S. Count Johann Heinrich von Bernstorff, the Herald claimed that Wilson 
had failed to deliver a just or workable peace.  The article concluded that Wilson‟s status abroad 
had diminished and the Germans were awaiting the coming presidential elections for more 
productive action from the United States.
87
 
The day before the Senate vote, the Los Angeles Times continued to show its support for 
the treaty.   It published an editorial from well-known Republican and one time Wilson 
administration member as head of the U.S. Food Administration during World War I and 
immediately afterward, Herbert Hoover.  Hoover asserted that the Senate should approve the 
treaty with reservations and the President should accept the terms.  He suggested that failure to 
participate in the league would prove detrimental to American economic growth abroad. 
Continued international political participation, alleged the author, would be the key to continued 
American economic growth in foreign markets in Europe as well as Asia.  He predicted that, if 
the U.S. did not reach out to Europe and the rest of the world, the economy would eventually 
grow stagnant.
88
   In Hoover‟s view, neither American nor European markets could afford such a 
catastrophe so soon after the war. 
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The San Francisco Examiner also paid close attention to the coming Senate vote and 
identified what it believed was one of the major issues with the peace pact.  The Examiner 
reported: 
We would have had a treaty of peace negotiated, signed, ratified and proclaimed a full 
year ago if Mr. Wilson had not insisted upon interweaving the terms of peace his 
scheme for a perpetual entangling alliance involving the United States in future 
quarrels between nations in all parts of the world.  The sensible procedure…would 
have been to make and proclaim peace terms, and afterward to have summoned the 
nations to a congress in which a sound and durable League of Peoples could have 
been established.
89
 
 
The editorial reported that “There will be plenty of time after American problems have been 
settled to discuss proposed alliances and leagues for the future government of the world.”90  This 
piece shows that even newspapers opposed to the treaty and league covenants did not believe 
that the United States should discontinue participation in international affairs.  What the 
Examiner refused to support was an alliance that it believed disproportionately benefited other 
nations, like Great Britain, and did not serve the United States‟ primary interests. 
In March, the Treaty of Versailles was once again voted down both with and without 
reservations.  David Lawrence of the San Francisco Examiner probably summed up the vote best 
when he wrote: 
Technically the United States is still at war with Germany.  America‟s foreign 
policy is undefined.  And the deadlock in the Senate will be carried into the 
presidential and congressional elections for final settlement next November. 
Briefly, that tells the story of what has happened after nine months of wearisome 
debate.  But the effect on the future…is not simple analyzed….  Any campaign 
orator or writer of political text books who tries to fix the responsibility in the 
Senate upon either the Democratic or Republican parties as such will have about 
as much chances of carrying conviction as the man who attempts to blame the 
failure of the treaty upon the disagreeable winter…. 
But there is no escaping one outstanding fact – President Wilson has suffered the 
third defeat in eighteen months.  His loss of Congress in November, 1918 was 
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followed by the defeat of a ratification resolution in November, 1919, and now in 
March, 1920, the treaty is formally sent back to him with the Democratic Party 
split in twain.
91
 
 
Lawrence also held that Wilson must accept a majority of the blame for the treaty‟s 
second failure because he was unable to rally the majority of his party‟s Senators behind 
his cause and he failed to see the wisdom in compromising so as to get at least part of the 
agreement accepted.  In the author‟s view, the direction of American foreign policy was 
to be the foremost election issue in November 1920. 
In the same vein as the San Francisco Examiner, other papers sought to assign blame for 
the treaty‟s rejection in their editorial pages.  The Los Angeles Times reprinted editorial 
commentary from several papers in cities all across the United States that overwhelmingly 
placed blame on either of two persons.  According to the Times, culpability was being placed on 
both President Wilson as well as Senator Lodge for the failure of a treaty to pass into law, but the 
majority of these commentaries especially assailed President Wilson for his unwillingness to 
compromise on the treaty. The majority of comments fell on partisan lines, each side hoping to 
make the more convincing case against the other for delaying or rejecting American international 
participation in the League of Nations.
92
  In the wake of the second defeat of the treaty, a rivalry 
began over which party‟s foreign policy would be adopted by the majority of the public in the 
upcoming elections. 
There was also evidence of partisan commentary in some papers aimed at Wilson and the 
Democratic Senators of the South.  The Kansas City Star nicknamed them “Wilson‟s Death 
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Battalion” and claimed that the Senators followed his orders through all the votes on the treaty.93  
The Star claimed that the “obstinate refusal of Woodrow Wilson to accede to the reservations to 
the league covenant” and blatant partisanship were among the main reasons why the treaty 
failed.  The Star asserted that the Democrats of the South, who were obedient to the President‟s 
orders, were the main culprits in leading to the defeat of the treaty.  It also stated that a few 
Southern Senators who were up for re-election and feared the unpopularity of the President‟s 
stubbornness wisely sided with the Republicans to maintain their own standing in the Senate.  
Using the Senate vote as evidence, the Star showed that there was little patience left for a 
bipartisan solution.  The paper returned to its pro-Republican stance, hoping that a suitable treaty 
would be passed without the Democrats.
94
  Without increased support in the north and Midwest, 
where Wilson had made significant inroads during the elections of 1912 and 1916, the 
Democrats would likely suffer a congressional defeat similar to the one in 1918 based largely on 
their failure to agree upon a workable foreign policy.  The treaty and the League, which had been 
quite popular, were being abandoned by some of the papers in this study that had previously 
supported the measures. 
In early June the Republican Party gathered in Chicago to pick their presidential 
candidate.  The frontrunners going into the convention were Army General Leonard Wood, who 
was backed by party conservatives, moderate Illinois Governor Frank Lowden, and progressive 
California Senator Hiram Johnson.  After the first few ballots, the three frontrunners had 
fragmented convention delegates permanently between them, and party leaders began to seek a 
middle ground between the competing views.  It was ironic that Johnson lost support at the 
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convention because of his unrelenting campaign against membership in the League of Nations.  
Ohio Senator Warren G. Harding, a declared yet unlikely candidate coming into the conclave, 
became the Republican nominee on the ninth vote.  Harding was selected as the compromise 
candidate because he was a near opposite of Woodrow Wilson.  He was not an activist, a 
crusader, or advocate of great change.  Harding was a “joiner,” promising “normalcy,” and he 
was non-confrontational with most of his political foes.  His convivial nature and handsome 
appearance provided the Republicans with an appealing candidate.
95
  As Harding‟s running mate 
the delegates selected Massachusetts Governor Calvin Coolidge.  He became nationally known 
the previous year when he dealt with striking police workers in Boston because they were 
attempting to unionize.  Republican Party officials perceived that he had handled the situation to 
their liking and that he would be an excellent Vice-Presidential candidate.
96
 
No matter who the Democrats ran in 1920, it was assumed they would not be able to 
escape the shadow of Woodrow Wilson.  Heading into their convention, the Democrats had 
narrowed their field down to three men: Attorney General Mitchell Palmer, William Gibbs 
McAdoo the wartime Director General of Railroads and former Secretary of the Treasury as well 
as Wilson‟s son-in-law, and Ohio Governor James A. Cox.  As the convention progressed, 
Palmer and McAdoo lost delegates over a variety of issues, none of which included altering the 
approach to international affairs that Wilson had laid out in the preceding years.  Party leaders 
awarded Cox the candidacy after the forty-fourth ballot.  The party chose a rising political star, 
Assistant Secretary of the Navy Franklin D. Roosevelt from New York, as Vice-Presidential 
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candidate in an effort to capture support from his home state as well as to capitalize on his family 
name.
97
 
The Democratic ticket had the potential, though unlikely, to take the campaign in a 
different direction from the Wilson administration, but the President wanted to make sure they 
understood and stuck to his position.  Soon after their nomination, Wilson summoned Cox and 
Roosevelt to the White House for a discussion. There the three men discussed the campaign and 
Cox, disarmed at the sight of the ailing Wilson, pledged to support the President‟s policy of no 
compromise on the treaty.
98
  This aligned the Democratic candidates with President Wilson and 
his position on the treaty. 
Cox‟s plan to follow in Wilson‟s footsteps concerning the treaty received significant 
attention from this select group of papers throughout the campaign.  Reactions to this were 
mixed.  The New York Times, which had been a stalwart supporter of Wilson‟s treaty policy, 
positively portrayed Cox‟s commitment to the President.  The Times reported that Cox‟s message 
of renewing the debate over membership in the League if he were elected was drawing 
“prominent members” (offering no examples) away from the Republican Party to support the 
Democrats.  According to the editorial, this was because the defectors believed that membership 
in the League of Nations was the “Greatest Moral Issue.”99  The Times attempted to motivate 
more Republicans to stand against Harding, who opposed joining the league unless there were 
revisions to the pact. 
Pro-Republican newspapers, like the New York Herald, also commented on Cox‟s 
strategy.  The Herald reported that the League of Nations was the “Big Issue” for the Cox-
Roosevelt ticket.  One article highlighted Governor Cox‟s charge that Harding was not popularly 
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elected by party representatives but was merely a puppet of the “Senatorial oligarchy” that had 
caused the treaty to fail in March.  The author claimed that Cox‟s comments were overly partisan 
in nature in a public climate that was growing tired of personal assaults on candidates‟ 
backgrounds and credentials.
100
  
Though Cox made membership in the League and approval of the treaty the imperative 
issues in his campaign, Harding did not take the polar opposite view.  The New York Times 
reported that Harding repeated the claim that President Wilson had ruined the chances for 
membership in the league.  According to the Times, Harding was prepared to enter into an 
international association with Great Britain and France but not “Wilson‟s League of Nations.”  
The paper added that this association of nations, parallel to the League, would upset the 
European powers because they were already committed to the League of Nations.
101
  Though the 
Times negatively portrayed Harding‟s foreign policy in its hope of building support for Governor 
Cox, the paper did not suggest that Harding would withdraw the United States from international 
affairs. 
Throughout the campaign, the San Francisco Examiner maintained its opposition to the 
League of Nations, focusing steadily on what it saw as the problems with the covenant while 
continuing to pledge American support for international affairs.  One editorial claimed that the 
current covenant was a folly because it circumvented the Constitutional process in the United 
States, which required the Senate to approve all diplomatic agreements.  The editorial rejected 
the notion that Article X of the covenant should be accepted, while suggesting that, if it was 
rescinded, U.S. membership in an international association might be possible.
102
  Another 
Examiner editorial proclaimed that the treaty must be “flatly rejected.”  The editorial explained 
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that the treaty, which created an “Imperial Foreign Syndicate” over the U.S. government, would 
force Americans to fight compulsory wars for European interests.  But this was not a call to 
isolationism.  The editorial, citing the comments of Senator Knox of Pennsylvania, claimed that 
the United States would intervene in any war under a “compelling moral obligation” to the 
world.
103
  It is significant that the Examiner backed neither Cox nor Harding.  The importance of 
these articles is that they show that even adamant opponents of the peace plan still believed that 
the United States had a moral obligation to fight in wars if its interests were at stake. 
Several of the pro-Harding papers examined in this study also used commentary from 
notable opponents of the League to persuade voters to support their candidate instead of the Cox-
Roosevelt ticket.  An editorial in the New York Herald, featuring remarks by Republican Senator 
William Borah of Idaho, claimed that fear and suspicion toward the League were growing 
because of Wilson‟s unwillingness to compromise.  The editorial held that the league, in its 
current condition was the “supreme creed of imperialism” bolstering the European elite.104  The 
Herald focused on the fact that Wilson‟s one time supporter and powerful Congressional voice 
Borah were standing against his proposed peace plan, by default driving more voters into the 
Harding-Coolidge camp, which was reluctant to pledge support for or against the league with 
clarity. 
Another editorial in the New York Herald stated that “only some unforeseen 
circumstances can halt the trend of Republicanism.  The people, turned against the Wilson 
administration and suspicious of the League of Nations, are almost unanimous in their demand 
for a Republican President.”  The article claimed that Cox‟s alignment with Wilson and the 
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staggering inflation rate were causing the Democrats to continue losing the support of the general 
public.
105
 
Editorials in the Kansas City Star identified the poor economic situation and the League 
issue as hurting the already damaged Democrats.  The paper claimed that there appeared to be a 
“sweeping rebuke of the Wilson Party” due to its apparent failure to handle the rising food prices 
at home and due to the poor economic situation in Europe.  The Star proposed that voters think 
of “America first” in the coming elections.  This idea, according to the editorial, meant “more 
than the preservation of a free republic against the overlordship of the Geneva government.”  It 
signified a return to conducting affairs the “American way” and not under an “international 
tribunal” that would bankrupt the country with policies that failed to reflect the nation‟s 
interests.
106
  According to the Star’s editorials, the Democrats were being blamed for sacrificing 
too much national interest for membership in the League of Nations. 
Dissension in the ranks of the Democratic Party also became a topic of concern in some 
pro-Harding papers.  The Kansas City Star reported that Missouri Senator and opponent of the 
treaty James Reed would not meet with Governor Cox when he visited Kansas City, Reed‟s 
hometown.  The Star said the Senator‟s office claimed he was planning a “duck hunting trip,” 
leaving him unable to meet with the party‟s candidate.  The paper noted Reed‟s unrelenting 
opposition to the league as the likely reason why the Senator would not meet with Cox.  Bound 
to an unpopular position on the League, an unsteady economy, and discord within the Party, the 
Star believed the Democrats had much to worry about.
 107
  Pro-Republican papers in this study, 
like the Star, had their readers believing that Harding was sure to defeat the splintered 
Democrats. 
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Papers supporting the Republicans also found Harding‟s character, personality, and 
message easy to sell to the public.  For example, in an editorial appearing in the New York 
Herald, he was shown as an ordinary man, looking to make the world a better place.  The author 
asserted that Harding treated his political opponents with particular fairness and he only desired 
to unite the nation after the fragmentation that had occurred over the League dispute.  Also, he 
proclaimed that in reference to the League itself, Harding was wisely prepared to join an 
international association.  But he would not join this one because he opposed Article X. Clearly, 
in the Herald‟s view, Harding had a likeable personality as well as persuasive stance against 
what it believed was the most disagreeable part of the League covenant.
108
 
Other sympathetic papers presented the Ohio Senator as internationally minded as well.  
The Los Angeles Times published many editorials bolstering Harding as an internationalist.  The 
Times proclaimed that “Harding says he favors the principle of the League of Nations, but he 
desires the establishment of an international court, founding a league on justice and not military 
force.”  The editorial concluded that: 
The Times sincerely believes that the election of Harding is the only possible solution 
to the present controversy [over the league]; and for that reason it advises all friends 
of the League, who place country over party, to work and vote for the election of 
Harding as the surest and safest way to our entrance into an association to promote 
the preservation of future peace.
109
 
 
This editorial appealed to the public in hopes of reviving a bipartisan spirit that had previously 
existed under Wilson before the Paris peace conference.   The Times wanted to focus on the fact 
that under Harding, national interests and resources would not be placed in a secondary position 
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during international negotiations as they supposedly had been by Wilson during his last two 
years in office.
110
 
The Kansas City Star also published pro-Harding editorials that highlighted the 
candidate‟s internationalist message.  In an editorial published within weeks of the election, the 
Star asserted that Harding was the ideal candidate to lead the United States in a new international 
association.  According to the editorial, Wilson had soured not just domestic politics, but also 
American relations overseas, driving the French and other European nations to support Harding‟s 
bid for the presidency.  The Star believed there was a clear desire worldwide for a change in the 
United States‟ approach to the world.111  In another piece, from Reverend Charles Aked of the 
First Congressional Church of Kansas City, the Star unleashed another volley at Wilson‟s 
international policy.  Aked declared that: 
No man living is more profoundly convinced than I am that a League of Nations is 
imperiously demanded by the necessities of mankind.  No man living is more 
profoundly convinced than I am that the league as planned by the Versailles 
conference fails to meet these imperious needs.
112
 
 
Aked held that the League became a pack of vain conquerors once the leaders of the Allied 
powers barred the vanquished nations from the league; he believed that including them would 
have provided the world an opportunity to heal politically and thrive economically.  He claimed 
that, since some important nations of the world were excluded from the peace table, no real 
agreement could be reached that would not needlessly damage Germany and her wartime allies.  
Aked concluded that the pact as then conceived was an illegitimate alliance that America would 
one day be glad the Republican Senators rejected.
113
  These and other editorials showed a feeling 
that the Democrats and Wilson had led the nation astray with deep commitments to a League of 
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Nations that did not actually represent the country‟s best interests.  The Star presented a message 
that Harding and the Republicans would conduct international relations in a manner that better 
represented the interests of the American people and aided the world, too. 
The New York Herald also published editorials that presented Harding as reaching out to 
aid the world.  One editorial applauded Harding‟s position that he would not commit the nation 
to the league unless “serious revisions were made to the covenant,” if at all.  The editorial 
alleged that the current association would act as a “war breeder” because not all nations were 
welcome to join and it did not protect the self-determination of nations.  The piece argued that 
people in the Balkans, Middle East and Ireland were living unfairly under imperial oppression 
from France, Great Britain, and other European powers, something the Americans could not 
actively support.
114
  This editorial shows the way in which some pro-Republican newspapers 
used the debate over the treaty to make inroads with first generation immigrant voters in 
northeastern cities who usually voted for the Democratic Party. 
In the late stages of the election, the pro-Democratic New York Times began 
acknowledging Senator Harding as an internationalist.  An editorial titled “Harding Closes His 
Campaign” reported Harding‟s views on why the League had remained such a major issue in the 
campaign.  The editorial read: 
Touching upon the League of Nations Senator Harding charged that his opponents 
had stressed this issue in the campaign to draw the attention of the voters of the 
country from the inefficiency of the Democratic Administration in the handling of 
domestic affairs.  He then restated his attitude toward the Treaty of Versailles, 
reviewing his position as a Senator voting for the Lodge reservations.
115
 
 
The article highlighted the fact that Harding‟s stance against Article X of the covenant had 
remained.  This article ran just a week after Cox declared that he would accept reservations to the 
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Treaty with particular focus on the issue of Article X, if he were elected President.
116
  His shift in 
position was clearly too little too late.  Impending defeat certainly served as the motivation for 
Cox to adjust his stand away from Wilson‟s rigidness, but his efforts were too little too late.  The 
papers examined here were not going to shift their support for Cox after Harding had remained 
opposed to Article X since the beginning of the campaign. 
The presidential election on 2 November 1920 produced one of the most lopsided 
victories in U.S. electoral history.  The Republican ticket of Harding and Coolidge defeated Cox 
and Roosevelt by approximately six million votes, with a total voter turnout of twenty-six 
million voters.  Also, the Democratic “Solid South” broke by sending the electoral votes of 
Texas and Tennessee to the Republicans.
117
  The election was certainly a turning point, but not 
one away from U.S. international participation. 
An editorial from William Randolph Hearst in the San Francisco Examiner illustrated 
one anti-Wilsonian perspective on the Democrats‟ defeat.  Hearst proclaimed the Republican 
victory as one against “the Wilson Party and that party‟s pro-British, un-American policies.”  He 
emphasized that the United States was no longer a “crown colony” performing the orders of the 
King in England.  America, Hearst claimed, had returned to being “the Land of the Free.” 
According to the Hearst, the election was more about rejecting Wilson and the policies of the 
Democratic leadership than anything else.  To him, Harding had demonstrated a more acceptable 
approach to international affairs.  In addition, Hearst‟s anti-British sentiments were not hostile to 
general participation by the United States in international affairs.
118
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The Los Angeles Times drew attention to the approval of Harding‟s election in the foreign 
press.  One editorial claimed that the election was a rebuke to the “one man rule” of Wilson and 
claimed that “Wilsonism is alien to American traditions.” According to this editorial, Wilson‟s 
brand of internationalism was rejected in the election and that Europeans were generally happy 
about the defeat of the Democrats.
 119
 
The New York Herald focused on the belief that Harding would revive U.S. international 
leadership.  A selection in the Herald titled “U.S. to Become Real Leader in World Affairs” 
claimed that: 
Diplomats in Washington apparently are a unit in admitting that the United States is 
about to assume real leadership in the world of international thought.  Because the 
electorate has voiced its objections to the League of Nations as elaborated by 
President Wilson, world attention is centered now upon the part the next 
Administration will play in the international politics. 
This fact is regarded as the sincerest answer to those who contend that rejection of the 
Wilson league would mean a policy of isolation for the United States.
120
 
 
It is apparent by reading this editorial in the Herald that many believed he would take steps to 
make the United States a world leader like never before.  The Herald presented Harding‟s 
message as a rejection of Wilson‟s commitment to unqualified acceptance of the League, which 
the paper believed too tightly bound the United States to the interests of European nations. 
In the wake of Harding‟s election, the once pro-Cox New York Times expressed its belief 
that the President-elect would to rejuvenate U.S. foreign relationships.  One Times editorial 
reported read:  
It is felt here that it will be America‟s destiny to play again a great role in 
approaching settlements.  The American Government is directly concerned and 
interested, politically and economically, in the settlement of the question of securing 
peace and stability.  President-elect Harding‟s speech at Akron, containing 
expressions of the principles that illuminated American policy at the close of the war, 
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has given renewed hope to friends of peace in international circles that the incoming 
Administration will not fail, in its own way, to exercise the moral authority and 
strength which the United States possess for procuring such settlements as will 
contribute toward security of the civilized world.
121
 
 
The idea that Harding was not an isolationist had spread to some pro-Democratic papers.  Even 
advocates of Wilson‟s policy, such as the New York Times, were coming to view Harding‟s 
proposed method of international participation in a positive light.   
The debate over the League of Nations and the Treaty of Versailles throughout 1920 
certainly made the newspapers in this study assess where they believed the nation fit into the 
global community.  The Democratic papers in this study that supported the League through the 
campaign asserted that the firm alliance of the League of Nations would best American ideals in 
world affairs.  The pro-Harding papers seen here appeared to desire a less pre-committed and 
more flexible disposition for the United States in international relations.  Another certainty of the 
Republican message was that there would be no permanent military alliances to interfere with 
American interests.  The sources cited above show that during the campaign, these pro-
Republican newspapers did not present Harding as a candidate who wanted to pull the United 
States out of world affairs.  They showed him quite interested in creating new and different types 
of international relationships than the ones President Wilson had worked to create.   The papers 
used in this study presented the election not as a choice between isolationism and 
internationalism.  Rather, the election was viewed by these sources as a referendum on how the 
American people believe the United States should pursue their international objectives, through 
Wilson‟s League of Nations or through more independent channels of national diplomacy.  
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CHAPTER 3 - Taking the Lead Even Without the League: 
American Internationalism During the Harding 
Administration 
With the election of Warren Harding the voters of the United States did not just select a 
new chief executive.   They also chose a different way of conducting international relations than 
Woodrow Wilson had envisioned with U.S. membership in the League of Nations.  The Harding 
administration is often perceived as the first of several isolationist Republican Presidents to sit in 
the Oval Office.
122
  However, these newspapers presented Harding‟s administration as quite 
active in world affairs and effective in finding solutions to the world‟s problems.  Several of 
these papers praised the new Republican administration‟s approach to international affairs, 
presenting Harding and his cabinet members as committed to preserving American international 
interests and preventing a future war while maintaining the nation‟s responsibility to aid the 
world. 
Before Harding took office, there were several new issues that roused the attention of 
these papers.  Disarmament or at least negotiated arms limitations by the major industrialized 
nations of the world to secure a lasting peace was one of the foremost topics in the press.  A 
long-term peace accord may have seemed more difficult to be obtained when the United States 
Senate rejected the Treaty of Versailles for the second time, and membership in the League of 
Nations became even less possible when Wilson‟s ideological successor, James Cox was 
defeated in the 1920 election.
123
   But that is not the case. These events did not deter many of 
these press outlets from believing that the United States would continue to play an active role in 
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global negotiations through proposed armament cutbacks.  Many of the papers expressed faith in 
the incoming Republican administration to solve both the military and economic issues facing 
the United States and the world so as to secure a lasting peace.  In December 1920, the Kansas 
City Star published several editorials expressing hope that Harding would take up the cause of 
international disarmament.  The Star claimed that under Harding the U.S. “could properly 
assume leadership in formulating a new scheme of international relations” focusing on a better 
disarmament policy than that of the League of Nations.  This article also reported that Harding 
was planning to call another meeting of the world powers so as to work out a “create and entirely 
new structure” of international relations that would be more acceptable at home and abroad.124  
In another article the Star proposed that Harding would bring about harmony in the government 
so as to solve economic problems at home and in Europe as well suing for a separate peace with 
Germany.  A separate peace, the paper held, would provide the United States the opportunity to 
begin building international support for a disarmament conference that would get the global 
economy back on its feet and provide the world with a policy that would work towards the 
“preservation of world peace.”125  The Los Angeles Times also promoted the idea that Harding 
was to begin a campaign for international disarmament.  The Times reported that the President-
elect was already busy working on a plan to gather world leaders in hopes of establishing a new 
association of nations that would be based on law and strive for decreasing the possibilities of 
war through armament reductions.
126
  Hopes were high in these two pro-Republican papers that 
disarmament would become a reality when the Harding administration took office in March. 
The pro-Democratic papers also believed that disarmament would be the way to truly 
achieve world peace, but it would not only be the administration leading the way.  In January, the 
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New York World reported that disarmament legislation was being advanced in the U.S. Senate in 
legislation proposed by adamant opponent to U.S. membership in the League of Nations 
Republican William Borah.  According to the World, Borah was taking the lead by introducing 
to the Senate an amendment that would take leadership of the arms limitations and disarmament 
away from the League of Nations.  The paper claimed that the League of Nations had not 
addressed the issue directly or effectively because the United States had failed to join the 
association.  And without the United States there could be no discussion of world disbarment or 
arms limitations.
127
   
The World also praised President-elect Harding for becoming an active advocate for 
stopping another arms race.  The paper said that Harding and other world leaders were planning 
to take up important disarmament issues to “show the way for other nations to save themselves 
from bankruptcy and the menace of future wars.”  The World also stated that there was a 
growing conviction in the public that, if disarmament was to become a reality, the first military 
cuts would have to come from the navies of the world, which, the paper claimed, “justified 
themselves by war.”128  The paper presented naval arms limitations as one of the most important 
issues the country would have to deal with to secure a prominent position in international 
relations.  The World continually suggested that the Democrats would work with the President-
elect and the Republican majorities to promote an international policy centered on building a 
lasting peace.  
While some of the papers here offered praise and support for President-elect Harding‟s 
proposed international policies, others took the opportunity to assail the effectiveness of the 
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League of Nations.  The San Francisco Examiner, long-time opponent of the League, argued that 
at Geneva “politicians waste the world‟s time in politics and talk while millions suffer and 
millions die.”  The paper asserted that “it would be a blessing, indeed, if the whole tribe of 
international politicians could be shipped to the North Pole for a year‟s voyage” rather than 
allowing them to meddle in the affairs of every nation.  The Examiner alleged that all nations in 
economic turmoil would regain their financial stability not by following the League of Nations 
but rather by turning to open market participation with the United States and the rest of the 
world.
129
  Although the Examiner did not mention disarmament or arms limitations as the 
solution to the world‟s problems as the other papers had, this editorial clearly conveyed the 
Examiner’s message that the United States must stay involved in world affairs so as to ensure its 
own as well as the world‟s prosperity. 
The New York Herald published editorials expounding on its criticisms of the League of 
Nations.  In one editorial, titled “League of Nations Becoming an International Soviet,” political 
commentator Frank Simonds, who also contributed articles to the Kansas City Star, stated that 
the political disputes between the European nations were causing many problems within the 
League.  He claimed that the most significant conflict existed between the leadership and the 
representative council, diminishing any chance the League had at aiding the world in its time of 
need.  Simonds alleged that this constant conflict was not just a sign of the League‟s inability to 
get anything significant accomplished.  The conflict between the representatives and the 
leadership also indicated to him that the League was becoming “world parliament or Superstate” 
that would be run by Lenin and the Russian Bolsheviks, who were in collusion with the League 
leaders.  Also, Simonds asserted that disarmament under the guidance of the League would be 
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impossible because no major power really believed in its authority and they could not be 
trusted.
130
  Though Simonds‟s claims were sensationalized to say the least, his article shows that 
even those who were adamantly opposed to U.S. membership in the League still believed that the 
nation must take the lead in international arms reduction discussions or else nothing would come 
of it. 
In March, when Warren Harding took the oath of office to become the twenty-ninth
 
President of the United States, the Kansas City Star hailed the event as the coming of a new era 
for American foreign policy.  The Star alleged that “a solemn warning that America stands ready 
to resist any reversion of civilization was sounded” with the inauguration of Harding as 
President.  It claimed that his policy, as laid out in his inaugural address, “seeks no part in 
directing the destinies of the Old World, but she is ready to enter an association of nations for 
conference and counsel which will not impair the sovereignty of the United States.”  The Star 
also asserted that the majority of the President‟s inaugural address was aimed at international 
affairs, which the paper applauded because, according to the paper, the “minds of the entire 
country” had been focused on how the United States would pursue international relations under 
his leadership.  Another major point of Harding‟s speech that the Star praised was his new 
military policy, which was claimed to focus on no permanent military alliances, “resistance of 
assaults on civilization,” and “the formation of an association of nations for conference” in hopes 
of bringing about “approximate world disarmament.”131  The Star presented Harding as being 
quite focused on international affairs and added plenty of commentary to suggest that the paper 
supported the new President‟s policy goals. 
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The Los Angeles Times also offered its praise for the inaugural policies of President 
Harding.  In its front-page story, the Times identified what it thought to be the “salient features” 
of Harding‟s inaugural address.  The top five points from the speech listed in the article listed 
were (1) Harding‟s pledges to provide freedom from foreign entanglements, (2) the rejection of 
the League of Nations as a military compact, (3) readiness to join an association of nations, (4) a 
desire to pursue a course for international disarmament and/or arms limitation, and (5) a “desire 
for the establishment of a world court to adjudicate justifiable international disputes.”  It is 
important to note that none of the top five points of the speech highlighted in the article suggest 
that Harding had planned to withdraw the U.S. from international relations.  Even Harding‟s 
rejection of the League of Nations was tempered by the Times when they claimed that the refusal 
of the League was because Harding had no desire to place the U.S. in a permanent military 
alliance.  According to the Times, Harding was very much focused on developing an active role 
for the United States in international affairs upon taking office.
132
 
The Los Angeles Times printed an official reaction from its editorial board to Harding‟s 
inaugural address.  The Times, which had supported American membership in the League since 
its inception, was slightly saddened by Harding‟s announcement that he would not commit the 
country to the League of Nations.  However, it supported Harding‟s decision to reject the League 
in its current form because, the Times believed, no one wanted to get involved in another war 
that would only benefit certain powers in Europe.  The paper backed Harding‟s call for a “return 
to normalcy.”  It also asserted that Harding‟s proposed “normalcy” was intended to address 
industrial strife affecting the country at the time, not a turn towards political or economic 
isolationism.  The Times alleged that Harding‟s administration “will consider all questions of 
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foreign policy” on the basis of national security and interests, but would also remain cognizant of 
the global concerns.  The Times held that Harding was planning to move to make peace with 
Germany on separate terms because, as far as it was concerned, a “military peace had already 
been secured” and it was time work toward “the attaining of an industrial peace.”133  The Times 
presented Harding‟s arrival as the coming of a new way of conducting foreign negotiations that 
would reflect more national self-interest than Wilson‟s policy had.  But, at the same time, the 
Times asserted that Harding would not reject the United States‟ economic or military 
responsibilities to the world. 
In July 1921, a formalized peace with Germany was signed by United States.  Several 
newspapers proclaimed this event as a major victory for the administration as well as the nation.  
The New York World reported that the Senate vote to ratify the separate peace plan would open 
the door for the resumption of “friendly relations between the United States and Germany,” a 
step the paper believed would surely help improve the economic situation of both countries.
134
  
The Kansas City Star also hailed the opportunity wrought by the peace agreement, claiming that 
the United States may finally “open the way for the resumption of diplomatic relations with 
Germany and Austria.”  The Star alleged that only some Democrats in the Senate stood in the 
way of this proposal, with the Republican leadership taking the initiative and pushing though the 
program Harding had desired of them.
135
  These papers acknowledged the signing of the peace 
with Germany was a mere formality since the nation had not been involved in military 
engagements with Germany since 1918, but the treaty was still significant.  Both papers 
recognized the necessity of moving on with this peace settlement, separate from the Treaty of 
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Versailles so that the United States could begin aiding Germany in the reconstruction process, 
something Harding voiced his commitment to since his inauguration. 
In the wake of the news about the finalization of a peace agreement with the Central 
Powers, the Kansas City Star published an editorial from official British war correspondent and 
prolific writer about the war, Sir Philip Gibbs.  Gibbs proposed that the United States had taken 
the lead in world affairs after the war, regardless of its status with the League of Nations.  He 
argued that a conference between the great naval powers (the U.S., Great Britain, and Japan) 
would be the only way to secure the peace for at least a generation, and the United States would 
be the only power to bring together such a conference.
136
  It was clear in the Star‟s earlier 
publications and this editorial from Gibbs that they believed the United States would certainly 
play a decisive role in world affairs. 
Also that July, the U.S. government took another step towards advancing one of the most 
critical parts Harding‟s international policy, a global naval arms limitations conference.  The Los 
Angeles Times reported that with the passage of the 1921 naval appropriations bill, Congress had 
attached a clause deeming it necessary for the Harding administration to begin working on an 
international arms limitations conference.  The paper reported that “President Harding sent a 
special communication to Republican leaders, approving the amendment and giving assurances 
that the administration has already been seeking information with regard to the attitude of foreign 
nations on the general subject.”  The Times also commented on the agreeable relationship 
between the President and Congress claiming: “It is interesting to note that the President did not 
make any overtures to other nations concerning disarmament before he was formally backed by 
                                                 
136
 Sir Philip Gibb, “Present Awakening of Rulers to World Perils a Turning Point in History,” Kansas City Star, 3 
July 1920, 22C. 
 67 
action of Congress.  This is a marked departure from the policy of Woodrow Wilson.”137  The 
Times viewed Harding‟s action as both necessary and proper; necessary to discuss limiting naval 
arms with the leaders of the world and proper because he waited for Congress to provide its 
official backing.  Again, this shows the desire in some of the papers examined here to abandon 
the methods of the former President while keeping the United States involved in world affairs. 
In November the naval arms limitations conference became a reality as world leaders 
gathered in Washington to negotiate a settlement on the subject.  However, before the 
Washington Conference commenced the nation would take a moment to remember its 
contribution to the World War with the entombment of the Unknown Soldier at Arlington 
National Cemetery.  Many newspapers took this opportunity to reflect on the meaning of the 
American war effort and specifically what it meant for Americans to fight wars on foreign soil.  
The New York Times reprinted the entirety of Harding‟s dedication speech in the 12 November 
1921 edition but published a three-paragraph excerpt on its front page that the paper perceived to 
be heart of President‟s address.  The first two paragraphs of this selection read: 
The loftiest tribute we can bestow today – the heroically earned tribute – fashioned in 
deliberate conviction, out of unclouded thought, neither shadowed by remorse nor 
made vain by fancies, is the commitment of this Republic to an advancement never 
made before.  If American achievement is a cherished pride at home, if our 
unselfishness among nations is all we wish it to be, and our influence and strength, 
yea, of our aspirations and convictions, to put mankind on a little higher plane, 
exulting and exulting, with war‟s distressing and depressing tragedies barred from the 
stage of righteous civilization. 
There have been a thousand defenses justly and patriotically made; a thousand 
offenses which reason and righteousness out to have stayed.  Let us beseech all men 
to join us in seeking the rule under which reason and righteousness shall prevail.
138
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These words from the President show that he believed (and the Times agreed with him) that the 
United States had a duty to aid the world in ending the threat of what many believed to be 
excessively destructive modern war.  In an accompanying article, the paper claimed that the 
soldiers had valiantly done their duty for the world and now the government must do their best to 
ensure that civilization would not have to endure such a tragic and unnecessary event again.
139
 
The New York Herald featured a poignant statement about the dedication of the Tomb of 
the Unknown Soldier from well-known political correspondent and 1921 Pulitzer Prize winner 
for newspaper reporting, Louis Seibold.  Seibold asserted that “To-day the American people 
bowed in reverence before the body of the warrior and paid tribute to the heroism of the 
American Soldier in the great world war.”  The author contended that the entire country 
embraced the sacrifices of the Unknown Soldier and all American soldiers who protected the 
world from tyranny, militarism, and injustice.  Seibold added that the soldier also signified the 
moral commitment of the United States to defending what was righteous in the world.
140
  Seibold 
clearly stated that he and the Herald did not believe the United States would, could, or should 
back away from global affairs. 
 The entombment ceremony provoked an emotional editorial from the San 
Francisco Examiner.  The Examiner reflected on what the end of the fighting meant, it stated 
that:  
There would be no more war, no more oppression of the weak by the strong.  No 
people [were] to be governed any more without consent.  The abominations of 
diplomacy and militarism and naysayers were to disappear.  The law of right was to 
displace the law of might.  Henceforth the world was to be safe for democracy.  All 
the fine phrases with which the millions had been led to the slaughter were repeated 
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as though their authors were honest men who meant to make good the glittering 
words they had dinned in the ears of the credulous world. 
That was the thought and the confident expectation of the peoples of the world three 
years ago this day.  And now look upon the world and see how that thought and that 
expectation have been disappointed?
141
 
 
The paper also claimed that the total repudiation of the Versailles Treaty by the world would be 
“the only road that will lead the world to real peace.”  The Examiner‟s disappointment with the 
way the war‟s settlement had played out over the preceding three years was tempered with hope 
for the coming disarmament conference.  The paper concluded by stating that “on this 
anniversary of the armistice, and this eve of another conference of the victorious Powers here on 
our own American soil, every patriot and friend of humanity ought to do all that he can do to 
bring about such a wise and salutary and necessary result.”  In the wake of the entombment of 
the nation‟s “unknown warrior,” the Examiner, remaining adamantly opposed to the League of 
Nations, expressed its confidence in the United States‟ ability and continued commitment to lead 
the world in formulating a lasting peace agreement.
142
 
Before the conference started, the Kansas City Star claimed that the nation and the world 
were desperately seeking a peace agreement that was different than the other pacts that had come 
since the war.  Conveying a message much like the above article from the San Francisco 
Examiner, the Star claimed that the League of Nations proposal had ruined the potential peace 
that could have been attained at Versailles.  The paper also expressed its sincerest hope that the 
Washington Naval Conference would not seek a type of pact that attempted to link a peace 
agreement with an international association like the League.  What the Star desired was a peace 
negotiation that might lead to the foundation of another international association based on 
democratic principles and legality unlike what it believed the League of Nations to be.  The 
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paper alleged that the League was primarily a military alliance that favored certain countries like 
Japan and Great Britain over other nations in less fortunate situations, such as China.
143
  Though 
its assessment of the League as principally a military pact was misguided, it was apparent that 
the Star wanted to see the formation of an international organization that would address the 
issues of national sovereignty and equal representation better than the League of Nations 
agreement had. 
When the Washington Naval Conference opened the day after the ceremony for the 
Unknown Soldier at Arlington, these papers had another important international event to report 
on.  Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes declared the administration‟s ambitions for naval 
cutbacks to the attending nations.  All of the media outlets examined in this study reacted 
favorably to this news, assuming it was a sign that the U.S. was taking the lead in the pursuit for 
a lasting world peace.  The New York Times reported: “Bold, direct, and clear, the American 
Government plan for the limitation of naval armament was laid before the world today.”  The 
Times claimed Hughes‟s message possessed “a positiveness and an aggressiveness seldom 
known in international negotiations.”  The paper also asserted that the opening sessions of the 
conference appeared to be full of potential for clearing up global concerns over armaments.  
According to the Times, this hope seemed to create a “wave of optimism” over the entire 
delegation.
144
  In another article in the same edition, the Times stated that “the essence of the 
proposal is this: That the United States offers to go far beyond what she asks Great Britain or 
Japan to do” to preserve international armament limitations.  The United States, according to the 
Times, would be forced to suspend production of more ships already under construction than 
either Great Britain or Japan.  The paper supported the view that all three nations, along with the 
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rest of the world, needed to take a naval building holiday in order to ensure that some sort of 
peace could last.
145
 
The Los Angeles Times also focused on the belief that the country would have to cut back 
its military ship building far more than its former allies.  The paper agreed with Hughes‟s 
assertion that the United States must take the lead by arms control as a measure of good faith, 
too.  The Times was enthusiastic, claiming that “seldom has a conference of nations assembled in 
an atmosphere of greater cordiality than that which enveloped the opening feeling here [in 
Washington].”  The Times alleged that Hughes‟s speech did little to upset any of the delegates, 
even from Great Britain and Japan, a sure sign in the paper‟s opinion that there was general 
acceptance, at least in principle, for the U.S. program to control naval armaments to prevent 
another arms race that could potentially upset already struggling commercial markets.
146
 
Louis Seibold, writing in the New York Herald, also praised Hughes and Harding for their 
proposed limitation ratios of capital ships (5-5-3) between the U.S., Great Britain, and Japan.  
Seibold reported that “the President of the American Republic and his Foreign Secretary 
revealed the determination of the American people to demand action to correct the hardships 
from which all peoples suffer due to unnecessary and expensive armaments.”  Referring to the 
previous Anglo-Japanese agreements concerning interests in the Pacific Ocean as “archaic 
diplomacy,” Seibold attacked the way agreements on arms limitations had been handled.  He 
claimed the old agreement could not preserve rational and democratic principles, but he believed 
the United States‟ entry, as one of the foremost world powers, into these negotiations with the 
Washington Conference would give hope to the region and the world for peace.  To round out his 
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argument, Seibold asserted that the delegates were so enthusiastic about Hughes‟s speech that he 
regularly paused during his speech for the cheers and applauds from the delegates to dwindle 
before continuing with his “enlightened proposal.”147  The Herald also expressed its belief in the 
urgent need for an agreement at the Washington Conference by titling the reprinted text of 
Secretary Hughes‟s speech “More Wars Are Seen Unless Nations Act.”148  Clearly, the Herald 
viewed the Washington Conference as the prime opportunity for the Harding administration and 
the United States to change the direction of international relations for the better. 
The Kansas City Star also issued its support for the measures proposed by the Secretary 
Hughes and President Harding.  The Star claimed that the United States was once more taking 
the lead in international affairs.  One article reported: 
Mr. Hughes sought to convince the world of America‟s good faith and intentions as to 
armament reductions in the most forcible way possible.  He sought to show the 
United States was ready for action.  Whatever happens to the plan in conference, 
whatever modifications experts insist upon, the United States has shown her 
willingness to do business.  It is out in the open, plain and understandable, not only to 
the people of the United States, but to the world.
149
 
 
The paper went on to assert that the moment was right for the administration to make such an 
overture, claiming that only slight progress had been made in achieving a “real peace” since the 
signing cease fire of the World War just over three years prior.  The Star expressed its approval 
for the administration‟s departure from Wilson‟s style of diplomacy, which the paper accused of 
being “secretive” and “too willing to compromise with foreign powers.”  The paper also claimed 
that the conference would be successful if the United States and England came to a greater 
understanding for parity between their two navies.
150
  The Star presented to readers as fact that 
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the nation‟s foreign policy was moving in a different direction than it had under Wilson but 
certainly not towards isolationism.  It presented Harding‟s foreign policy as embracing a new 
way of conducting foreign affairs that focused on preserving peace and preventing war in a 
different way than Wilson had. 
In February 1922, when the Washington Conference drew to a conclusion, all of the 
newspapers examined in this study expressed a sense of enthusiasm about the agreements being 
finalized.  The reaction in these media outlets to this conference had a significantly different feel 
than the conclusion of the Paris Peace Conference in 1919.  In the wake of the post-war 
conference many of these newspapers generally supported the proposed pact from the conclave 
in Paris, but they also questioned the long-term ramifications of some of the finer points in 
regards to the Treaty of Versailles and League of Nations.  In the case of the San Francisco 
Examiner, there was significant opposition to the Treaty of Versailles altogether, but this was not 
the case after the Washington Conference.  The New York Times approvingly reported comments 
from Lord Arthur James Balfour, then Lord President of the Council and head of the British 
delegation.  Balfour claimed that “the Conference on Limitation of Armaments had 
accomplished things that the League of Nations could not have hoped to do.”   The Times also 
reported that Balfour, along with other prominent politicians around globe, supported President 
Harding‟s call for a new association of nations that would supplant the League of Nations.  
According to his statements in the article, Balfour desired a less cumbersome and overarching 
association between nations.
151
  In another article, the paper alleged that there was overwhelming 
support from the United States Senate for the agreements reached at the conference, with Henry 
Cabot Lodge strongly supporting the accords.  The Times claimed that Lodge was one of the first 
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to express his acceptance of the proposed armament limitations and promises to guarantee the 
Open Door trade policy with China.
152
  It is fair to suggest that the Times believed that the world 
had been made a safer place and American interests had been protected as a result of the 
meeting. 
The New York Herald also presented the conference as an overwhelming success, but the 
paper chose to focus on the aid provided to struggling China in its front-page article.  Louis 
Seibold, preparing to wrap up his reporting at the conference for the Herald, proclaimed that 
“solemn pledges were made to-day by the nine most important Powers to cooperate for the 
maintenance of peace on land and sea.”  He alleged that as a result of the agreements made at 
Washington the “shackles had been taken off” China and that the entire world would once again 
respect the Open Door policy proposed by United States.  This had particular implications for the 
Japanese who had claimed Manchuria, the Korean Peninsula, sections of Siberia, and parts of 
Mongolia as their rightful possessions as part of the Treaty of Versailles.  Seibold claimed that 
the accords forged at Washington cancelled out previous Japanese incursions into Chinese 
affairs, delivering the Chinese a “new bill of rights.”153  Seibold stated in his report that the most 
important results of the Washington Conference were the rights and privileges granted to China.  
He certainly believed that the Harding administration had done well to reach out to protect 
liberty and freedom not just for Americans but for other peoples on the other side of the globe, 
too. 
Also reporting on the closing ceremonies of the conference, the Los Angeles Times 
praised the administration‟s achievement of supposed international peace and security.  In 
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one article of the several reviewing the outcomes of the peace parley, the Times contended 
that: 
A way has been provided for the fulfillment of a great hope.  The conference has 
blazed a trail.  Treaties have been negotiated limiting armaments, righting ancient 
wrongs and removing potential causes of future wars.  These treaties must not only be 
ratified, but must be honorably observed by all the signatories in order that the spirit 
which animated the conference may go forth, like the beams of the sun until it has 
encircled the world.
154
 
 
The Times also claimed that after the conference placed “international relations on a higher and 
nobler plane than they occupied before the World War.”  The article closed with an allegation 
that true global friendship had been secured and that the Times “could not have reasonably hoped 
for more.”155  For the Times, the hope for world peace, or at least a good chance at it, seemed to 
have been achieved at the conclusion of the conference.  
With media reactions to the events of Washington Conference being so positive, it is no 
wonder that none of the papers reviewed for this study called for the Harding administration to 
reconsider joining the League of Nations.  It appeared that the Republican leadership was doing 
all that could be expected, and in some papers‟ opinions more than expected, in pursuing a 
successful foreign policy.  In many of these papers, the administration was considered to be 
doing more to preserve the peace with naval armament limitations and guaranteeing economic 
freedom for the nations of the world than the League had done in its three-year existence. 
The next major international event that caught the attention of these papers was the 
Genoa Conference in April 1922.  The summit was called so that European powers could meet 
with Germany and Austria to reassess the reparations payment schedule.  Though the United 
States was not itself a recipient of reparations from Germany and Austria, the conference proved 
to be of significance in the U.S.  Before the conference several papers noted with regret that the 
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United States would not be participating directly in the conference, but remained hopeful that the 
Harding administration would become active at later conferences.  The Los Angeles Times 
reported that “enough already has appeared to indicate how keenly the delegates from every 
country miss the presence of America from the negotiations but all of them are convinced this is 
simply a preliminary to another conference with wider scope wherein the United States will 
participate.”156   
The San Francisco Examiner on the other hand lamented only in jest the fact that the 
United States was not sending a delegation to the European conference.  One editorial alleged 
that the “Prodigal Sons” (Europe) needed their wealthy father (the United States) to come and 
once again bail them out of trouble.  The Examiner ended up praising the administration‟s 
decision to not attend because the paper claimed that nothing of importance would come out the 
conference, unlike what had happened in Washington just months earlier.  This was so, the 
Examiner claimed, because Europe was not ready to begin a serious peace process in the manner 
that the United States had aptly demonstrated at Washington.
157
  There were sentiments both for 
and against U.S. participation at the conference, but important international news was about to 
come out of Italy. 
The other European powers learned from their diplomats that representatives from 
Germany and Soviet Russia had met at Rapallo, a seaside town outside of Genoa, to negotiate a 
separate trade agreement.  At Rapallo, the Soviet Russia and Germany agreed to nullify the 
territorial claims in the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk and to normalize diplomatic relations between 
their two countries.  The agreement did little to ease the discord between Germany and the 
western European nations.  They disapproved of the pact primarily because it threatened the 
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newly created nations in the Baltic States as well as Poland, which were established in territory 
ceded in the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk.
158
  However, in some of the newspapers used in this study 
the Treaty of Rapallo was perceived as a positive event.  The Los Angeles Times, for one, 
reported that the Allies were wrongly planning to exclude the Germans from the rest of the 
Genoa Conference because of the measures they had taken by formalizing an agreement with the 
Soviets.
159
  The Times, though concerned about the reactions from the Allied Powers, proclaimed 
in an accompanying article that the U.S. should not worry about the German-Soviet Pact.  The 
Times praised Harding‟s “hands-off policy” because it believed that the treaty would assist the 
struggling economies of Europe, something the Times believed the Soviets could assist in.
160
 
Two particular articles, one from the Los Angeles Times and the other from the San 
Francisco Examiner, illustrated the acceptance some in these papers had for the Treaty of 
Rapallo.  The Times proclaimed that any reports coming out of Genoa that presented the treaty as 
a bad thing came from merely “reactionary correspondents” who either hated the Soviet Union or 
wanted to see the European powers slip back into a state of war.  The paper reassured any 
concerned readers by declaring: 
As a military alliance there is nothing for western nations to fear for the 
present, in a rapprochement of Russia and Germany.  Modern wars are economic 
conflicts.  They are won and lost behind the lines.  Russia and Germany could not 
support a formidable military force for a single summer campaign.  An army without 
supplies is little more than a mob.  It was economic weakness that caused their attack 
on Poland to collapse when it appeared on the eve of success.  Until they are again 
economically and industrially strong they will not constitute a military menace.  
Whatever the alarmists may write about it, the immediate peace of Europe is not 
threatened by a commercial treaty between Russia and Germany.
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The Times concluded that only nations who did not want to see the economic recovery of 
Germany and the Soviet Union should be concerned, but according to the paper this did not 
include the United States.  As far as the Times was concerned the agreement between Germany 
and Russia was something the United States should be happy to observe because it meant that 
Europeans were taking the initiative to rebuild their war torn countries without direct U.S. 
support.
162
  The San Francisco Examiner’s coverage of the German-Soviet pact was similar to 
that of the Los Angeles Times, but the Examiner added that the European powers could learn a 
lesson from the pact.  The paper claimed that the Allies, who had continued to be exceedingly 
punitive towards the German government even after they had overthrown the aristocracy, 
adopted democracy, and were doing its best to repay the outrageously large reparations placed 
upon it, had driven the Germans and Soviets together.  The paper concluded that if the European 
powers wanted true economic stability and revival they needed to ease their pressure on the 
Germans for reparations payments.
163
  It was apparent in both of these articles that some in the 
media believed that if there was any blame to be assigned over the Treaty of Rapallo it should be 
given to the Allies themselves.  Also, they show that some of the papers in this study were still 
very concerned with European affairs, even in instances that did not directly involve the U.S. 
government. 
The last major international event that occurred during the Harding administrations came 
in January of 1923 with the Paris reparations conference.  This conference ultimately failed to 
settle on a program for reparations payments because the French and the British could not agree 
on how reparations from Germany should be collected, which led to the French military 
occupation of the Ruhr region of Germany.  A number of the newspapers used here covered the 
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proceedings in Paris assuming that economic concerns were becoming paramount in global 
affairs and that military matters had been settled for the time being.  However, the Russian-
German agreement did raise concern for the United States.  Although the U.S. was not receiving 
reparations from the former Central Powers, it was collecting on wartime loans from the Allied 
countries.  This put U.S. leaders in a tenuous situation because the French needed the reparations 
to pay back loans to the U.S. but those reparations payments were also handicapping the German 
economy.  The New York Herald reported that the Harding administration was well abreast of the 
situation and was attempting to avoid choosing sides between the French and Germans.  The 
Herald claimed that Harding was attempting to satisfy both nations‟ positions because he was 
sympathetic to the demands of the French leaders, considering their economic situation, but he 
was also all too aware of the potential damage that increased payments could mean for both 
German and world markets.
164
 
The Kansas City Star expressed its disappointment with the French unwillingness to 
compromise on a new reparation scheme in an article titled “THE ALLIES SPLIT.”  The Star 
claimed that the French had driven apart the Allied camp with their “wholly unreasonable 
demands” against the German government.  The paper also expressed regret over the French 
threat to occupy the Ruhr region of Germany, which was a major industrial production region.  
The French intended to confiscate the raw materials and any other valuable goods in the region 
to provide a supplement the reparations payments, which they believed were insufficient from 
the German government.
165
  After France deployed its army of occupation, the Star reaffirmed its 
position that economic problems needed to be solved in Europe before any type of reparations 
restructuring could be reached.  The paper stated that the French military action was not going to 
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solve any problem.  The Star remained confident that the Republican administration, while 
staying on “friendly terms” with both nations, would begin working on a financial program with 
American bankers and congressional leaders to resolve the situation.
166
 
The Los Angeles Times issued its repudiation of France‟s occupation of the Ruhr in an 
editorial titled “A Hazardous Venture.”  The Times blamed France for taking unilateral and 
dangerous measures to solve their financial problems.  The paper suggested that Germany‟s 
newest ally, Soviet Russia might be able to offer them some assistance if they were petitioned.  
The paper claimed that American banking interests would likely assist the country through 
financial hard times in the near future.  In another article, the Los Angeles Times, sharing the 
sentiments of the Kansas City Star and New York Herald, expressed its confidence that the 
Harding administration would create a program to assist the French and German governments 
out of their economic hard times.
167
 
The Harding administration did indeed begin working on a program that would assist the 
nations of Europe with the problem of reparations payments.  However, it would not be Harding 
initiating the program but his successor Calvin Coolidge.  Throughout this period, these 
newspapers presented the Harding administration as more than willing to negotiate with world 
powers and keep the United States quite active in world affairs.  When reporting on the most 
notable international event during the Harding administration, the Washington Naval 
Conference, every one of the newspapers examined in this study expressed a belief that this 
meeting had achieved significant results in securing world peace.  According to the sources 
presented here, had it not been for conference, the world may have been a far different place with 
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Germany facing even more wretched terms from the Allied Powers and some kind arms buildup 
occurring among the British, Japanese, and Americans in the mid- to late-1920s.  The accounts 
of the events presented by these select newspapers clearly portrayed Harding and his 
administration as interested and active in world affairs.  These papers showed no inclination that 
the United States government and the American people wanted to, or were going to, withdraw 
from the political processes of world affairs. 
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CONCLUSION 
In July 1923, President Harding was in the midst of a nationwide tour that had started the 
previous month.  His tour was similar to Woodrow Wilson‟s stumping tour in September 1919 in 
that the focus of the tour was to build more for his administration‟s foreign and domestic 
policies.  The difference was that Harding‟s policies were already more popular than Wilson‟s 
were on his tour in 1919.  However, some historians speculate that the tour was really directed at 
preparing the way for his re-election campaign in 1924.
168
  Like Wilson, Harding experienced 
health problems as his train was in the western part of the United States.  The President was 
rushed to San Francisco where he took up rest at a local hotel.  Unlike Wilson, however, Harding 
did not survive his bout of ill health.  On 2 August 1923, President Warren Gamaliel Harding 
died at the age of 57.  No autopsy was ever performed but it has been speculated that the cause 
was either a heart attack or a stroke.  Right before his death, however, reports were coming out 
of Washington concerning scandals within his administration that would eventually lead to the 
dismissal of a cabinet member as well as several lower level administration officials.  His 
administration is closely associated with the Teapot Dome scandal, which produced the first 
member of a Presidential Cabinet, Secretary of the Interior Albert P. Fall, to be prosecuted for 
federal crimes.
169
   
These scandals along with supposed “isolationism” have become the popular memory of 
the Harding administration.  However, this study addresses only the issue of foreign relations 
during the Harding years.  It would be misguided and overly simplistic to suppose that Harding‟s 
presidency had reduced the concerns of the chief executive to criminal acts and isolating the 
country from the world.  In actuality, the period of 1918 through 1923 was a time in which the 
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United States was very interested in and concerned with international affairs and how they would 
be conducted. 
Late in the war and into the immediate post-war period, the papers in this study circulated 
editorials and news stories that applauded continued American interest in foreign affairs.  
Worthy of particular interest is the fact that pro-Republican papers, like the New York Herald, 
Kansas City Star, and Los Angeles Times, actively presented a message promoting continued 
U.S. involvement and interest in the dealings and relationships with the world.  This is 
particularly significant because many of the Republican leaders during this period, such as Henry 
Cabot Lodge and Warren Harding, are often labeled “isolationists.”  The data presented above 
suggests an entirely different view of what several Republican newspapers in larger cities 
presented as the goals of the Grand Old Party.  If one thing can be certain when examining these 
sources it is that these Republican newspapers, along with the pro-Democratic papers used in this 
study, did not want the U.S. to shirk international involvement and consistently encouraged and 
praised continued interest in the events of the world. 
After Wilson‟s announcement of the Fourteen Points, the situation only became more 
complex because he had provided a public definition of American war aims.  Though this was 
certainly a good public relations decision in the short term, the proclamation in some ways hurt 
the President‟s image as time went on.  This is because these papers expected him to deliver all 
the provisions of the policy in the peace settlement.  However, when the objectives enunciated in 
the Fourteen Points program were not achieved in the Versailles Treaty, many of these papers 
remained general supportive of the treaty and the League covenants.  Problems only arose when 
the President returned to the United States to push through the ratification of the treaty without 
Senate debate.  Aware of the concerns several Senators had with the terms of the treaty, several 
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of these papers began seeing compromise between the President and the Republican-dominated 
Senate as the most likely and, in most instances, favorable outcome.  When the President refused 
to negotiate with the Senate Republicans, whose majority support he needed to pass the treaty by 
a two-thirds margin, the majority of these papers returned to their partisan leanings in assessing 
who was right and wrong in the treaty debate.  The Senate Republicans, Henry Cabot Lodge, and 
President Wilson all were vilified for being too obstinate in their positions and thus failing to 
come together to find a solution to keep the United States in line with the Allies.  However, 
according to these sources, the fight was not between isolationist Republicans and 
internationalist Democrats.  The pro-Republican papers were careful to identify their prominent 
party leaders as favoring international relationships with the other Allies but resistant to a 
permanent military alliance in the League.  When the vote for the Treaty of Versailles resulted in 
rejection both with and without reservations, these papers blamed either the President, the 
Republican reservationists, or, in the case of the Los Angeles Times, both for failing to reach 
some sort of compromise.  Neither the pro-Republican nor the pro-Democrat papers examined 
here described the debate between internationalists and isolationists; the contest they presented 
was between treaty reservationists and those advocating an acceptance of an unaltered peace 
settlement. 
Though the treaty was defeated in the Senate in November 1919, the fight for its passage 
was not over.  By the beginning of the 1920, there was a renewed hope in all of the newspapers 
used in this study that the rivaling factions in the U.S. government could reach a compromise as 
long as the Senate leadership would reconsider the treaty for a vote.  The new vote happened in 
March, leading several papers reviewed here to believe the President along with the Senate 
Democrats loyal to his orders and the Republican reservationists would be able to compromise 
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on the treaty.  The debate once again focused predominantly on Article X, the military 
commitment clause of the League of Nations covenant.  When a deal again failed to be realized 
in the Senate, many believed it was because of either Wilson‟s or the Republican Senators‟ 
unwillingness to compromise with the other.  The treaty and League membership then became 
important issues in the 1920 presidential campaign.  
When the newspapers went to support their candidates in the election it was once again 
not a competition between isolationist Republicans and internationalist Democrats.  In the 
months preceding the election, pro-Republican newspapers presented Harding as a man deeply 
committed to involving the United States in international affairs.  Some of the papers in the study 
even went so far as to suggest that Harding would have the U.S. join the League of Nations so 
long as the disputed Article X of the agreement was vetoed.  Throughout the campaign there was 
a belief in many of these papers that some form of membership in the League was possible with 
either candidate and that American involvement in international affairs was assured with both 
Cox and Harding.  As the campaign drew to a close, several of these papers reflected historian 
Thomas Fleming‟s assertion that “the main issue was not the League but Wilsonism.”170   
The result of the vote was a lopsided victory for Harding, leaving many in the pro-
Republican press excited because their party had regained the White House.  The victory to 
many of these papers signified that the country had rejected the policy of Woodrow Wilson and 
the military commitments that were imbedded in his League of Nations.
171
  Whether the country 
had truly grown tired of Wilson is something for another study to consider more thoroughly than 
this one, but what can be deciphered in these newspapers is that their coverage leading up to the 
result of the 1920 election does not depict Harding as running a campaign that sought to 
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segregate the United States from European or global affairs.  His sympathies for the 
internationalist cause can also be seen in his nomination of former President and staunch 
advocate for U.S. membership in the League of Nations William Howard Taft to the position of 
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court in 1921.  Harding could not have believed Taft was totally 
wrong-headed if he nominated him and rewarded him with appointment to the Supreme Court. 
When Harding took office all of these papers were full of hope for potential American 
influence abroad, particularly concerning the issue of international disarmament.  Harding and 
members of his administration, led by Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes, took the 
initiative and held a successful conference to reduce naval armaments and secure peace 
especially in the Pacific Ocean and parts of East Asia that were not just approved by well over 
two-thirds of the Senate but were also approved by nearly all the conference‟s members.172  
Many newspapers stated that the United States‟ goals were achieved at the conference and that 
international security had been secured with promises to establish naval ratios between the 
United States, Britain, and Japan.  Also, several of these papers argued that the agreements also 
established safeguards for nations wanting to trade with China, which was becoming even more 
of a power vacuum during this period.  However, the conference was not the end for the Harding 
administration‟s or the press‟s interest in international dealings.  As reparations payments 
became a more apparent problem, national attention once again turned to trying to solve the 
problems of the world.
173
  These concerns for world affairs cannot possibly leave observers of 
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this period thinking that these American papers or United States government wanted to remove 
itself from international negotiations or affairs. 
What can this selected group of papers tell us about the United States in the late stages of 
World War I and the years immediately following it?  Though these papers cannot prove what all 
news papers said at the time, they are sufficient to suggest that a far more complex model that 
that of isolationism is needed.  It can also be said with confidence that none of these papers 
suggested that the United States, under the leadership of either political party, should attempt to 
distance the nation from international affairs in general.  It is fair to suggest that these papers 
would not have likely advocated an isolationist program from any politician.  When examining 
these sources, it is clear they all recognized that the U.S. had a vested interest in the economic, 
political, and military interest in the affairs of the entire world.  Although each of these papers 
chose to focus on their own specific issues at times, their messages were largely in unison 
claiming that the United States was willing and able to participate on the world stage in the years 
immediately after World War I. 
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